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Private Concerns of Private Plaintiffs:
Revisiting a Problematic Defamation
Category
Nat Stern*

Consider the following scenario. After several bouts of severe headaches,
a woman visits her doctor to seek relief. The physician orders a series of
expensive tests covered by Medicare and supplemental insurance; ultimately, he
prescribes a common medication for her condition. Skeptical of the necessity of
such elaborate treatment and resentful of the inconvenience and discomfort that
it entails, the patient calls her daughter, a neurologist who lives several hundred
miles away. From her mother's account, the neurologist concludes that the
doctor could readily have arrived at the same diagnosis without the tests to
which her mother was subjected. Upset, the mother contacts the chief
administrator of the hospital with which the doctor is affiliated. She tells the
administrator that her doctor "orders useless tests on people just to line his
pockets." Upon learning of the accusation, the doctor brings a suit for
defamation.
Obviously, this spare description of these hypothetical events does not
establish whether the patient will be found liable for defamation or for how
much. A privilege under state law, for example, might defeat the suit. Apart
from special circumstances, however, it appears that the magnitude of recovery
in such a case may well depend on a court's characterization of whether the
patient's assertion involves either a public or private concern. At a minimum,
designation as a matter of private concern drastically lowers the level of fault
that a plaintiff must show in order to recover presumed or punitive damages.'
In addition, a finding of a private concern may eliminate the plaintiff's
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see also infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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constitutional burden of proving falsity.' Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has intimated that other barriers to recovery in defamation actions may be
lightened or removed by the absence of a public concern.'
Given the weight placed on the determination of public or private concern
classification, a would-be speaker might reasonably hope for a reliable way of
anticipating to which compartment her message would be assigned. Or having
blurted her defamatory comment without the benefit of legal consultation, a
defendant contemplating settlement might at least expect a confident assessment
of the odds and scope of her potential exposure. A decade-and-a-half after the
Supreme Court injected the public/private concern dichotomy into defamation
doctrine, however, such assurance remains unavailable. The struggle by lower
courts to interpret the Court's terse pronouncements on the distinction between
public and private concerns has not crystallized into a useful methodology.
Rather, courts have generally proceeded by way of ad hoe analyses or ipse dixit

conclusions. The inability of courts to translate this doctrine into a lucid
framework, however, does not represent a failure of judicial imagination.
Instead, this Article contends, the enterprise was destined to founder because of
the inherent indeterminacy of the distinction between public and private
concerns in defamatory expression.
Part I of the Article traces the route to the Court's decision to add the
public/private concern inquiry to the complex4 body of defamation doctrine, as
well as the potential impact of this distinction beyond the context in which it was
first promulgated. Part II reviews courts' efforts to categorize defamatory
speech in a rational way, seeking to demonstrate that this goal has inevitably
eluded them. From a broader perspective, Part III examines the Court's
longstanding ambivalence toward elevating speech of a presumably public
nature over other expression. Against this backdrop, the Court's decision to
distinguish between public and private concerns in defamation amounts to an
avoidable choice, not an obligatory standard. At the same time, as Part IV
2. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); see also infra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
4. The multiplicity of rules and considerations in the Court's defamation regime
has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to
DefamationLaw Through Uniform Legislation: The Searchfor an ElegantSolution, 72
N.C. L. REv. 291,293 (1994) (First Amendment jurisprudence contributing to "disarray"
and "chaotic nature" of defamation law); George C. Christie, JudicialReview ofFindings
ofFact,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 14,56 (1992); Sheldon W. Halpern, OfLibel, Language,and
Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1990)
(proposing alternative to "fragmented, confusing and unsatisfying array of criteria and
requirements"); Developments in the Law--The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1610, 1615 (1999); Patricia A. Thompson-Hill, Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders: "Matters of Private Concern" Give Libel Defendants Lowered
First Amendment Protection, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 883, 927 (1986) (libel litigants
confronted with "complex, treacherous defamation framework").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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shows, withdrawal of this element from defamation doctrine would not require
wholesale abolition of the public/private distinction in free speech jurisprudence.
The Article concludes that restoration of the regime that prevailed prior to the
public/private concern criterion would restore a more defensible balance to the
constitutional law of defamation.
I. THE PATH To AND FROM DuN & BRADSTREET
Whether defamatory speech implicates a public or private concern emerged
as a touchstone for protection in the Supreme Court's decision in Dun &
Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,Inc.5 The decision followed a decade
in which the Court had repeatedly sought to reconcile society's interest in "free
and full interchange of potentially useful information and ideas"6 with the
individual's stake in redressing "invasion of the interest in reputation and good
name."7 Dun & Bradstreet and subsequent decisions have left lingering
uncertainty over the extent to which the presence of a private concern liberates
state defamation laws from constitutional restrictions other than the limitations
on presumed and punitive damages lifted in that case.
A. From New York Times to Gertz: The Primacyof Status
Prior to 1964, the Supreme Court regarded libel as entirely beyond the pale
of First Amendment protection.' Defendants were thus subjected to the harsh
regime of the common law, which afforded scant protection to defamatory
speech.9 In mostjurisdictions, a publisher of libel was held strictly liable unless
it could be proven that the statement was either true or privileged."

5. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
6. David W. Robertson, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: In Praiseof Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 200 (1976).
7. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971).

8. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (stating that libelous speech is not "Within the area of

constitutionally protected speech"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942).
9. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 1-6 (1998) (defamation under
common law "was essentially a strict liability tort with most rules stacked in the
plaintiff's favor"); see generally Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., andBeyond: An AnalyticalPrimer,61 VA. L. REV.
1349, 1351-64 (1975) (discussing the strict liability aspect of the American common law
of defamation prior to 1964); Patrick J. McNulty, The Gertz Fault Standard and the

Common Law of Defamation: An Argument for PredictabilityofResult and Certainty
ofExpectation,35 DRAKEL. REV. 51, 59-61 (1985) (noting that aplaintiffneed not prove
intent or negligence at common law).
10. See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (stating that "[i]f the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" revolutionized defamation law by

supplanting a portion of common law liabilities with abundant constitutional
protection for criticism of public officials. Under the actual malice requirement,
a public official could recover damages" for a defamatory falsehood relating to
official conduct only ifit could be shown that the defendant either knew that the
statement was false or had acted with reckless disregard of whether the statement
was false." The Court rendered this standard even more formidable by
demanding that a plaintiff demonstrate with "convincing clarity," rather than the
normal preponderance of evidence, that the defendant had acted with actual
malice.' 4 While New York Times did not wholly eradicate the damages of selfcensorship,' 5 the decision
was widely hailed as a landmark defense of freedom
6
of speech and press.

publication was libellous [sic] the defendant took the risk ...
[because a] libel is harmful
on its face"); McNulty, supra note 9, at 59 (noting that "[a] defendant is strictly liable,
absent the defenses of truth or privilege, even though his conduct may be innocent or
reasonable"); see also LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5, at 15

(1978) (noting that the common law of defamation in the United States was "a part of the
tort law of 'strict liability' or 'liability without fault' until 1974 (footnotes omitted)).
The severity and complexity of the common law of defamation have been widely
criticized. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 9, at 1350-51, 1356 & n.24 (discussing the
common law of defamation and the wide criticism by legal writers of its complexities,
anomalies, and inconsistencies); Robertson, supranote 6, at 230 ("A bewildering array
of rules governed the award of damages for defamation at common law, befitting the
complex scheme that determined liability in the first instance." (footnote omitted)).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. The actual malice rule was soon held to apply to criminal cases as well. See
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,67-75 (1964).
13. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
14. Id. at 279-80. This evidentiary barrier was bolstered by several subsequent
holdings. Garrisonheld that the clear and convincing evidence standard entails proof
that the statements were made with a "high degree of awareness of their probable falsity."
Garrison,379 U.S. at 74. In addition, the standard requires that appellate courts apply
de novo review to determine whether the record in fact establishes actual malice with
convincing clarity. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(stating that in cases concerning First Amendment issues, the appellate court must make
an independent examination of the entire record). Moreover, the requirement that the
defamatory statement be "of or concerning" the plaintiff has been applied stringently to
preclude recovery where the statement's application to the defendant is uncertain. See
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 82-83 (1966).
15. See David A. Anderson, Libel andPress Self-Censorship,53 TEX. L. REV. 422,
435-37 (1975).
16. In an oft-cited paean, Alexander Meiklejohn was quoted approvingly as calling
the decision "an occasion for dancing in the streets." Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case: A Note on "The CentralMeaningofthe FirstAmendment", 1964 SUP. CT.
REV. 191,221 n.125.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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Three years later, the Court in CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts 7 extended the
actual malice rule to speech about nongovernmental plaintiffs who qualified as
"public figures."'" In his pivotal concurring opinion, 9 Chief Justice Warren
emphasized the artificiality of a rigid distinction between public officials and
private individuals when many persons outside of government wield power and
influence comparable to that of officeholders.20 Application of the New York
Times standard to members of this group, he concluded, would help to safeguard
the public's right to "be informed on matters of legitimate interest."'"
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,Inc.,'2 the Court temporarily severed the link
between the actual malice rule and the identity of the plaintiff. Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion expanded the rule's application to include all defamatory
falsehoods concerning "matters of public or general concern ' irrespective of
the plaintiff's status.' In practice, the required presence of such a concern or
"interest '26 served as a meager limiting principle; as construed by lower courts,
virtually any matter found worthy of media coverage was deemed to qualify.27

17. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court also handed down a decision in a companion

case, Associated Pressv. Walker. Id.
18. Id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (stating his adherence to the actual
malice standard in the case of "public figures").
19. The result in Butts derived from an unusual and somewhat complicated
configuration of opinions. For a detailed dissection, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The
ReasonableMan and the FirstAmendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REv.
267, 275-78.
20. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
21. Id. at 164-65.

22. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
23. See id. at 31-32 (affirming lower court decision that the New York Times actual
malice standard applies to private individuals involved in a public event). As in Butts,
Rosenbloom's holding represented a patchwork of divergent views. Justice Brennan
wrote for three Justices of an eight-member Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's opinion; Justices Black and White concurred in the
judgment.
24. Id. at 44.
25. See id. (stating that the protection applies to both famous and anonymous
persons).
26. Id. at 42-43.

27. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 206 & n.50 (noting that only 6 of over 100
reported decisions addressing the question clearly concluded that the alleged defamatory
publication or broadcast did not deal with matters of public interest).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Given the daunting hurdle posed by the actual
malice standard,28 even private
29

individuals faced slim prospects of recovery.
A few years later, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 ° marked a sharp
retrenchment from Rosenbloom's permissive standard and restored the centrality
of plaintiffs' status in defamation doctrine. Under Gertz, the actual malice
requirement for threshold liability was confined to public officials and public
figures. States could now permit plaintiffs designated as private figures to
recover for actual damages upon a showing of negligence.3 However, the Court
continued to prohibit presumed or punitive damages even for private figures in
the absence of a demonstration of actual malice.32

B. Dun & Bradstreet and the Revival of Content-BasedStandards
While Gertz had apparently rejected basing plaintiffs' evidentiary hurdles
on the subject matter of libelous statements,33 Dun & Bradstreet34 reintroduced
this approach to defamation doctrine. There, Greenmoss based its suit on a
credit report issued by Dun & Bradstreet that falsely stated that Greenmoss had
filed for bankruptcy. The error resulted from a mistake by one of Dun &
Bradstreet's employees.35 Although the question of whether Dun & Bradstreet
acted with reckless disregard was not presented at trial, the Vermont Supreme
Court upheld ajury verdict awarding punitive damages to Greenmoss. Gertz's
requirement that such damages be supported by a finding of actual malice, the
court found, was limited to actions against media defendants.36

28. See Marc A. Franklin, Winners andLosers and Why: A Study of Defamation
Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 455,471,489,498; John A. Neuenschwander,
Is Fame Ever Fleeting? Contemporary Mission v. New York Times Co., 12 COMM. &
L. 27, 27 (1990) (stating that the actual malice standard "is a most formidable barrier that
few plaintiffs ever scale").
29. See Eaton, supranote 9, at 1373 (suggesting that the actual malice standard
provided near immunity to defendants in defamation actions).
30. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31. Id. at 347 (allowing states to determine standard of liability "so long as they do
not impose liability without fault").
32. Id. at 349. This apparent principle, however, was modified in Dun &
Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). See infra notes 39-41
and accompanying text.
33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (criticizing
Rosenbloom's reliance on judicial determination "on an ad hoc basis which publications
address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not"). For the reasonableness
of this interpretation of Gertz, see infra notes 47-52.
34. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
35. The employee, a fourteen-year-old student paid to review Vermont bankruptcy
proceedings, had inadvertently attributed to Greenmoss the bankruptcy of a former
employee of the company. Id. at 752.
36. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 418 (Vt.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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In sustaining the state court's decision, Justice Powell's plurality opinion
agreed that Gertz did not apply to the case.3 7 The opinion, however, sidestepped
the issue of whether a defendant's nonmedia status diminishes constitutional
protection.38 Instead, the opinion characterized Gertz as a decision that
addressed defamation of a private individual on a matter of public concern.39
Where the falsehood does not involve a matter of public concern, the opinion
reasoned, a different constitutional balance should be struck.' Specifically,
Justice Powell concluded that the First Amendment permits recovery of
presumed and punitive damages in such cases without a showing of actual
malice.4'
In determining that Dun & Bradstreet's credit report did not involve a
matter of public concern, the plurality assessed the report's "'content, form, and
context ... as revealed by the whole record.""'4 Under this test, the plurality
identified several factors that weighed against finding a public concern. As
"wholly false" speech made "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience," the report could stake no claim to heightened

First Amendment protection.43 In addition, because the report was sent to only
five subscribers who were bound to keep the information confidential, it did not
' or
implicate any "strong interest in the free flow of commercial information ' M
45
promote "uninhibited, robust, and vehement" debate of public issues. Finally,
the hardiness and verifiability of credit information, combined with market
incentives for accurate credit reporting, diminished concern about the "chilling"
effect of libel suits for allegedly false reports.'

1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).

37. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion; Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White concurred in the judgment.
38. See id. at 753 (affirming judgment "for reasons different from those relied upon
by the Vermont Supreme Court"). For discussion of a potential media-nonmedia
distinction, see infra note 62.
39. Id. at 751,756. The concurring Justices endorsed this characterization. Id. at
764, 774.
40. Id. at 756-61.

41. Id. at 763.
42. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
43. Id. at 762.

44. Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
45. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
46. Id. at 762-63. Justice Powell noted, however, that the holding did not
categorically relegate all credit reporting to diminished constitutional protection. Id. at
762 n.8.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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C. Dun & Bradstreet: Criticism and Corollaries
Dun & Bradstreethas evoked considerable criticism as well as questions
about the reach of its rationale that defamatory statements warrant differential
protection according to their content. Some of the attack has been directed at the
perceived disingenuousness of Justice Powell's depiction of Gertz as governing
only defamation on matters of public concern. The ostensibly unqualified
language of the Gertz majority opinion authored by Justice Powell disclosed no
such limitation on its holding.47 Indeed, Gertz invoked as grounds for rejecting
the Rosenbloom plurality's approach the difficulty of judges' "decid[ing] on an
ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and
which do not.'" Other opinions in succeeding terms echoed Gertz's skepticism
toward this type of enterprise.49 Prior to Dun & Bradstreet,commentators s° and
lower courtss" had commonly assumed that Gertz's restrictions did not

47. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) ("[W]e hold that the
States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability

is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.");
see also Arlen W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating
Definition, CommercialSpeech, and Unfair Competition Considerationsin the Law of
Injurious Falsehoods, 62 TEMPLE L. REv. 903, 976 n.166 (1989) (Gertz opinion
"appeared to contemplate a set of fault and damages rules triggered by the single factor
ofthe presence of a private figure plaintiff.").
48. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346; see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 786 n. 11 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing unwillingness to
empower courts to decide what speech is of public concern as "precisely the rationale"
for repudiating Rosenbloom).
49. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (asserting that the Rosenbloom test's deficient
balancing of competing interests "led us in Gertz to eschew a subject-matter test for [on]e
focusing upon the character of the defamation plaintiff"); cf Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)
(justifying in part extension of First Amendment protection to conmercial speech on
grounds that "no line between publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial
advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn").
50. See, e.g., George C. Christie, Underlying Contradictionsin the Supreme
Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981 DUKE L.J. 811, 820 n.61; Virginia G.
Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the FairCreditReportingAct, 72 GEO. L.J. 95,
106 (1983); Donald Meltzer, Toward a New Standardof Liabilityfor Defamation in
Fiction, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1115, 1116 (1983).
51. Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir.), reh'gdenied,
744 F.2d 94 (1984), and cert. denied, 496 U.S. 1107 (1985); Bufalino v. Associated
Press, 692 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983); Dodrill v.
Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ark. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356, 1363 (Haw. 1975);
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 693-94 (Md. 1976); Rutt v. Bethlehems'
Globe Publ'g Co., 484 A.2d 72, 83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Memphis Publ'g Co. v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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distinguish among private figures' defamation suits by subject matter. It is not
surprising, then, that Dun & Bradstreetprompted charges that Justice Powell had
retrospectively concocted a revised version of Gertz. 2
Logical consistency aside, observers have also faulted the confusion sewn
by Dun & Bradstreet'sdichotomy between public and private concerns. Many
have contended that looking to the "content, form, and context" of defamatory
speech to ascertain its nature supplies little guidance, and that the plurality's
reference to a few features of Dun & Bradstreet's credit report failed to infuse
this standard with meaningful substance. 3 Some have suggested despair that
any elaboration of the public concern test can provide consistent notice to
potential defamation defendants.' Moreover, the test's addition to the multiple

Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412,415-17 (Tenn. 1978).
52. See, e.g., Donald L. Magnetti, "In the End, Truth Will Out"... or Will It?
"Merchantof Venice, "Act HI,Scene 2, 52 Mo. L. REV. 299, 328 (1987); McNulty, supra
note 9, at 80-85; Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
OutrageousOpinion, DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601,686 n.327 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Dun and Bradstreet, Hepps,
and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primeron the Future Course ofDefamation, 75
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1541 (1987). Even Justice White, who like Chief Justice Burger
supported the plurality's qualification of Gertz but preferred overruling Gertz outright,
construed Gertz as intending to govern defamation of private figures irrespective of
subject matter. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 772
(1985) (White, J., concurring).
53. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Rolefor an
Old Doctrine in the ConstitutionalLaw of Defamation, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 241, 266
(1987); Andrew Jay McClury, BringingPrivacyLaw Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory
of Liabilityfor Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV.989, 1082 (1995); Post,
supra note 52, at 668; Michael Greene, Comment, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss:
CuttingAway from the ProtectiveMantle ofGertz, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1171, 1194 (1986);
David B. Katz, Note, FirstAmendment-Defamation-PrivateIndividual May Recover
Presumedand Punitive Damages Without a Showing ofActual Malice, 16 SETON HALL
L. REV. 785, 806 (1986). The 5-4 dispute within the Court over the characterization of
Dun & Bradstreet's report as not involving a matter of public concern has been cited as
evidence of the imprecision of the plurality's analysis. See Greene, supra,at 1194.
54. See, e.g., Patrick Baude, Has the IndianaConstitutionFoundIts Epic?, 69 IND.
L.J. 849, 861 n.36 (1994); Langvardt, supranote 53, at 259; McNulty, supranote 9, at
54-55; Joan E. Schaffner, Note, ProtectionofReputation Versus Freedom ofExpression:
Strikinga ManageableCompromise in the Tort ofDefamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 433,
449 (1990). One writer has gone so far as to assert "something of a consensus among the
commentators that the difficulties in developing any principled approach to the public
concern test render[s] it essentially standardless." Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible
Content DiscriminationUnder the FirstAmendment: The Strange Case of the Public
Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 551 n.1 14 (1998). Rosenthal's comment
refers to the public concern criterion in both the defamation and public employee
dismissal settings; the relative plausibility of distinguishing between public and private
concerns in the latter context is explored in Part M(B)(1). See infra notes 298-345 and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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permutations of defamation doctrine has been criticized for confronting speakers
with a more complex and less fathomable analytic framework.5 s All this
uncertainty, it is argued, induces self-censorship
by speakers wary of
6
unpredictable exposure to magnified liability.
Also uncertain is the extent to which the bifurcation of defamatory content
into public and private spheres modifies other constraints on private plaintiffs' 7

accompanying text. For an optimistic appraisal of the feasibility of identifying matters
of public concern, see Nadine R. Dahm, Note, Grand Jury Secrecy v. The First
Amendment: A Casefor PressInterviews ofGrandJurors,23 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 62326 (1989) (proposing analysis for content, form, and context standard).
55. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, PublicPurpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine,63 U. Cm. L. REV. 413, 473 (1996) (libel law
"subject to a bewildering variety of constitutional standards" generally based on extent
of public nature ofplaintiff and subject matter); see also Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, andSpeech
on Matters of Public Concern: New Directionsin FirstAmendment DefamationLaw,
20 IND. L. REV. 767, 782 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases: Libel
Law-Matters ofNonpublic Concern, 99 HARV. L. REv. 212, 221 (1985).
56. See Deeann M. Taylor, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps and Milkovich: The
Lingering Confusion in Defamation Law, 1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 153, 189.
57. This Article assumes as a paradigm for the issue of whether a defamatory
statement involves a matter of public concern a suit by a private figure. In theory, an
attack on a public official might have no bearing on the official's performance or capacity
and therefore be treated as a matter of private concern outside the New York Times
standard. However, the Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of statements
considered "relevant to [an official's] fitness for office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (allegation of criminal conduct, "no matter how remote in time or
place," always relevant for purposes of triggering actual malice rule). See Ocala StarBanner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1971). Courts generally assume that
criticism of a public official involves a matter of public concern. See, e.g., Culliton v.
Mize, 403 N.W.2d 853, 854-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139,
149 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); DiSalle v. P.G. Publ'g Co., 544 A.2d 1345, 1365 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (describing speech about public officials as "by definition" of public concern).
Where the question is specifically analyzed, courts still tend to reach the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Turner v. Devlin, 848 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. 1993); Moore v. Streit,
537 N.E.2d 408, 415-16 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989). See Smolla, supra note 52, at 1543-44
(stating that defamatory speech about public officials "will almost always qualify as a
matter of public concern"). For the view that the range of comment subject to the actual
malice requirement should correlate to an official's position in the government hierarchy,
see David Finkelson, Note, The Status/Conduct Continuum: Injecting Rhyme and
Reason into ContemporaryPublic Official DefamationDoctrine, 84 VA. L. REV. 871
(1998).
A finding of public figure status likewise can be expected to deflect debate about
the nature of the defamatory statement. Virtually any defamatory statement about an allpurpose public figure will be regarded as a matter of public concern. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see Smolla, supra note 52, at 1542-43; John C.
Ulin, Comment, FirstAmendment Crossroads-ExtendingConstitutionalDefamation
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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suits besides Gertz's restriction on presumed and punitive damages.

In

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,8 decided shortly after Dun &

Bradstreet,the Court held that "the common-law presumption that defamatory
speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media
defendant for speech of public concern."59 In such cases, therefore, the plaintiff

is constitutionally obligated to prove the falsity of the speech." Whatever the

implications of this requirement for actions seeking an equitable remedy6' or
brought against a nonmedia defendant,62 Hepps plainly contemplates the

Protection to Commercial Speech: A Critique ofU.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia and Some Suggestions, 39 UCLA L. REV. 633, 648 n.77 (1992); see
also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47, 56-57 (1988) (requiring "nationally
known minister" to show actual malice to recover damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress without explicitly finding that defendant's statement related to matter
of public concern). In a different way, defamation about limited-purpose public figures
may also inherently qualify as speech involving a public concern. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345. These individuals have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. Within the
context of a defamation suit, then, the plaintiff is classified as a limited public figure only
if the defendant's defamatory statement pertained to the plaintiff's active involvement
in a public controversy. Gerald G. Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public
Interest-The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 940-41 (1984).

Thus, the statement would seem by definition to address a matter of public concern. See
Ulin, supra,at 648 n.77; see also Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 674 (N.D. Ill.
1989)
(asserting that "absent invasions of privacy, speech about a public figure is generally a
matter of public concern"); Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns,
and Public Plaintiffs: TowardFashioningOrderfrom Conftsion in DefamationLaw,
49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 91, 133-40 (1987) (arguing against determinations of public or
private concern involving public officials or public figures). The workability of the
"public controversy" requirement is discussed in Part mI(B)(2). See infra notes 346-71
and accompanying text.

58. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
59. Id. at 777.
60. Id.
61. See Magnetti, supra note 52, at 345-62 (discussing proposed non-monetary

remedies that Hepps may leave available).
62. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court expressly reserved this question.
Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779 n.4. While the issue of nonmedia defendant liability lies beyond
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that Justice O'Connor's reference to media
status seems curious in light of the approach the Justices had recently taken to the
question in Dun & Bradstreet. While Justice Powell's plurality opinion declined to
address whether nonmedia defendants should receive lesser protection, five Justices
explicitly rejected the notion of differential protection, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773, 782-83 (1985) (White, J., concurring;
Brennan, J., dissenting), and another appeared to, see id. at 783-84 (attributing this

position to Chief Justice Burger). Some courts have indicated their understanding that
the Court has assigned constitutional significance to the presence or absence of a media
defendant. See, e.g., Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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possibility that its holding may not apply to speech of private concern. Thus, in
a suit arising out of speech assigned to this category, states may be entitled to
compel defendants to demonstrate the truth of their defamatory statements.63
Perhaps even more ominous for defendants are the implications for the fault
requirement of Dun & Bradstreet'semphasis that Gertz's analysis was premised
on the appearance of a public concern. 64 Since the negligence required under
Gertz had been established in the Vermont courts,65 Justice Powell's opinion
needed only to address the modification of Gertz's restrictions on presumed and
punitive damages where a private concern was involved. However, if the private
figure/private concern configuration presents a different calculus of interests than
that found in Gertz, then it may follow that Gertz's fault requirement does not
apply to that situation. Justice White immediately embraced this interpretation
of the plurality's reasoning;' a number of lower courts have also indicated their
view that the Court has eliminated the fault requirement in "private-private"
cases.0 Some commentators as well regard, as a plausible if not inevitable

484 U.S. 856 (1987); Schneider v. Pay'N Save Corp., 723 P.2d 619, 625 (Alaska 1986);
Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 497, 502 (S.C. 1998); but see
In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642, 647 (8th Cir.), reh 'g
denied,800 F.2d 787 (1986), andcert. denied,479 U.S. 1088 (1987); Britton v. Koep,
470 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 1991); Park v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 585
N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div.), appealdismissed, 607 N.E.2d 815 (N.Y. 1992), andleave to
appealdismissedin part,denied in part,613 N.E.2d 961 (N.Y. 1993). The notion of
heightened protection for media defendants has encountered widespread criticism. See,
e.g., Langvardt, supra note 57, at 110-11; Taylor, supra note 56, at 169-73; Anne
Benaroya, Note, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Revisited: A CriticalApproach to
Different Standards of Protectionfor Media and Nonmedia Defendants in Private
PlaintiffDefamationCases, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1268, 1285-98 (1990); Linda Kalm,
Note, The Burden of Proving Truth or Falsityin Defamation: Setting a Standardfor
Cases Involving Nonmedia Defendants, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 812, 833-53 (1987); but see
Potter Stewart, "Orof the Press", 26 HAsTINGs L.J. 631 (1975).
63. This inference was later reinforced by the Court's opinion in Milkovich v.
Lorain JournalCo., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), which attributed to Hepps the proposition that
"a statement in matters ofpublic concern must be provable as false before there can be
liability under state defamation law, at least.., where a media defendant is involved."
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added). It may be telling that this passage did not reserve
judgment on matters not of public concern in the same way that the principle's reference
to media defendants was stated as its minimum application. See id. at 20 n.4 (deferring
resolution of cases involving nonmedia defendants).
64. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 756-57 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 752-55.

66. Id. at 773-74 (White, J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Poison v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1990); Mutafis v. Erie
Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593, 595 (4th Cir. 1985); Sleem v. Yale Univ., 843 F. Supp. 57, 6162 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Ross v. Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (V.I. 1991); Post v.
Regan, 677 F. Supp. 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 854 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir. 1988), and cert.
denied,488 U.S. 1043 (1989); but see Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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reading of Dun & Bradstreet, that the Court opened the door to the imposition
of strict liability in such cases. 8 Moreover, the Hepps opinion may have hinted
at this possibility in noting that in private figure/private concern cases, "the
constitutional requirements do not necessarily force
any change in at least some
' 69
of the features of the common-law landscape.
II. DISCERNING A LINE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONCERNS:
THE FUI E PURSUIT IN THE LOWER COURTS

Courts' efforts to locate a principled boundary between public and private
concerns in defamation cases have not been encouraging. If not altogether
devoid of content, the concept of speech addressing matters of public concern
has proved sufficiently murky to give courts vast discretion in deciding whether
to place a libelous statement in this category. While perhaps some vagueness
could be relieved by clarification from the Supreme Court, the pervasive
unpredictability of courts' treatment of the issue suggests the intractable
difficulty inherent in the concept itself.

A. The Phenomenon of Summary Classification
The sparse guidance provided by Dun & Bradstreet'scontent-form-context
standard may be discerned from the frequency with which it is ignored. While
courts occasionally seek to analyze these factors in a systematic way, 0 the
analysis routinely consists of a conclusory pronouncement of the type of concern
involved. It is not unusual for a court simply to issue an unadorned statement
that the defamatory expression "is purely private"' or that the statement

F.3d 122, 128 (1st Cir. 1997); U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898
F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990); Wilson v. Slatalla, 970 F. Supp.
405, 413 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Pearle v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1505-06
(D.D.C. 1987).
68. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation:
Setting the Record Straight,71 IOWA L. REV. 226,227 n.1 (1985); Lewis, supra note 55,
at 774-75; McNulty, supra note 9, at 83; Gerald R. Smith, OfMalice andMen: The Law
of Defamation, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 39, 57 (1992); Smolla, supra note 52, at 1545-48;
Taylor, supra note 56, at 181.
69. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
70. See, e.g., Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 137, 140-43
(D. Me. 1998); Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1065-68 (D.C. 1996). Even the
extended discussion in Levinsky's, however, came only after a remand for the purpose
of developing a record to determine whether the speech in question involved a public
concern. Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1997).
71. Mullen v. Solber, 648 N.E.2d 950, 952 (111. App. Ct. 1995); see Ramirez v.
Rogers, 540 A.2d 475,477 (Me. 1988) (stating that the case involves "a matter that is not
of public concern").
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"concerned a public issue."' Other opinions, foregoing even this kind of
express declaration, obliquely classify the defamation by referring to the relevant
authority or category. In these instances, a court may signal its determination
that a slander involved a private concern by finding Dun & Bradstreet"to be
controlling in this case,"73 or convey its assumption that the speech addressed a
public concern by noting Hepps'srule governing proof of falsity. 74 Any number
of variations on these examples may be found.75
In some instances, a terse description or characterization of the defamatory
speech is apparently thought to constitute sufficient exegesis on the issue of
public concern. Thus, a court can justify deeming expression to involve a matter
of public concern by observing that an article "purported to give investment
advice to its readership,"76 or that a travel guide reported sexual harassment suits
against the manager of a youth hostel "open to the general population. 77
Conversely, one court professed in an aside that it had "little doubt" as to the
private nature of "accusations by a competitor that a dentist [was] stealing
patients and acting unprofessionally voiced in that dentist's office to a very small
group of people." 78 Other courts have similarly offered passing capsule

72. Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1067 (1989). See, e.g.,Yesner v. Spinner, 765 F. Supp. 48, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating
that the action "cearly... involves a private-figure plaintiff concerning matters not of
public concern"); Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 713 P.2d 736, 741 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1016 (1986) (asserting that statements "do not
involve a matter of public concern but rather a private business dispute").
73. Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
74. Cunningham v. United Nat'l Bank of Wash., 710 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D.D.C.
1989).
75. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 932
(M.D.N.C. 1997), aff'd in part,rev'd in part on othergrounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.

1999) (indicating presence of public concern by noting applicability of constitutional
principles under Gertz); Machleder v. Diaz, 618 F. Supp 1367, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),

aff'd in part,rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986), and cert.

denied,479 U.S. 1088 (1987) (implicitly finding public concern by citing actual malice
requirement for punitive damages); Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085,
1092 n.2 (Ala. 1988) (invoking Dun & Bradstreet to defend constitutionality of state
law's application to cases involving matters not of public concern); Dunlap v. Wayne,
716 P.2d 842, 846 (Wash. 1986) (acknowledging that balance between free speech and
reputation 'ips differently" when statement is about private concern); Story v. Shelter
Bay Co., 760 P.2d 368, 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (referring to "lessened protection
Dun & Bradstreet affords communications made in private disputes").
76. Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356, 362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 856 (1987).
77. Shaari v. Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Mass. 1998).
78. Ross v. Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 n.3 (V.I. 1991).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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depictions of the defamation at issue as a substitute for extended consideration
of the expression's content, form, and context.79
Perhaps these ipse dixit conclusions derive from a sense that the nature of
defamatory speech is more or less self-evident. The Dun & Bradstreet
plurality's sketchy analysis may well have encouraged the attitude that a court
knows a public or private concern when it sees it.8" If this belief did underlie
these classifications, however, the belief is deeply susceptible to challenge. As
will be argued in the following section,"' every example cited thus far (both in
text and footnotes)-as well as many others to be discussed that offer somewhat
more discussion-can be plausibly regarded as falling into the opposite category
from that selected by the court.
Admittedly, cases exist in which the court's abbreviated discussion might
arguably be defended as involving speech whose nature is intuitively obvious.
It is understandable, for example, that a court would not feel compelled to
expatiate on its assumption that a false report of the plaintiff s having AIDS 2
does not involve a public concern. Other defamatory expression might also
seem to fall naturally into the private realm without elaboration: an employer's
criticism of a former employee's performance,83 a suggestion that an elderly
newsstand operator was forced to quit work because of pregnancy,8 allegations
arising out of domestic relations," assertions of financial delinquency lacking

79. See, e.g., Medical Lab. Management Consultants v. American Broad. Co., 30
F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 n.ll (D. Ariz. 1998) (stating that secretly taped meeting with
medical laboratory's owner for use on broadcast dealing with faulty pap smear testing
was of public concern because it involved "[i]nformation about a medical issue with
potential life and death consequences affecting millions of women"); Veilleux v.
National Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 23, 34 (D.Me. 1998) (finding public concern where
television program alleging improper behavior by truck driver "addressed issues of
public safety on interstate highways and federal regulation of the trucking industry").
80. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)

(stating of hard-core pornography that "I know it when I see it").
81. See infra Part I(B).
82. People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo.), cert. denied,502 U.S. 860 (1991).

83. See Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Schneider v. Pay'N
Save Corp., 723 P.2d 619,620, 625 (Alaska 1986); Weissman v. Sri Lanka Curry House,
Inc., 469 N.W.2d 471,471, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Geyer v. Steinbronn, 506 A.2d
901, 904, 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
84. See Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc.,

978 F.2d 1065, 1067, 1068 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992), on remandsub nom. Mitchell v. Globe
Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Ark.), andcert. denied, 510 U.S. 931 (1993).
85. See Peroutka v. Streng, 695 A.2d 1287, 1289, 1293 (Md. 1997) (reference to
wife as an "emotionally abused" spouse); King v. Tanner, 539 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618-19,
621 (Sup. Ct.), reargument denied, 545 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (defendant's
naming plaintiff as father of her child); Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212, 1213, 1216
(R.I. 1995) (former husband calling former wife a "whore"); see also Guinn v. Church
of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 769, 778 n.44 (Okla. 1989) (elders of church
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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apparent larger reverberations for the community," or accusations of bigoted
behavior.' By the same token, the connection of some expression to a definite
public concern may appear so manifest as not even to warrant the discussion that
it receives: an assertion that the nation was at risk of an outbreak of a dangerous
disease,88 criticism of a newspaper article about restricted public access to part
of a nuclear generating station,89 rebuttal of a press conference called to question
the recruiting techniques of certain religious organizations, and an accusation
that the plaintiff had assassinated a presidential candidate.9
Still, as noted above, not every truncated examination of the public concern
issue represents an unexceptionable conclusion about the nature of the litigated
expression. Moreover, a cursory treatment of even relatively uncontroversial
cases is hardly a satisfactory way to develop coherent doctrine. The frequent
paucity of analysis in "easy" and debatable cases alike, rather, reflects a
hollowness at the core of the public concern concept. This perception is
reinforced by the rarity with which courts attempt to give substantive definition
to the concept, and the extent to which they vary when they do. Formulations
include speech that "relates to the ordering of government and society at large,"'93
that "is intended to effect political or social change or that is otherwise related
to enlightened self-government,"'94 that pertains to "a matter worthy of or the

referring to former congregation member as "fornicator").
86. See Ransopher v. Chapman, 791 S.W.2d 686, 686-87 (Ark. 1990) (calling
building contractor a liar and cheat); Dexter's Hearthside Restaurant, Inc. v. Whitehall
Co., 508 N.E.2d 113, 114-16 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 511 N.E.2d 620 (Mass.
1987) (listing liquor store as having delinquent account); Touma v. St. Mary's Bank, 712
A.2d 619, 620-22 (N.H. 1998) (announcing foreclosure of plaintiff's restaurant).
87. See Rety v. Green, 546 So. 2d 410, 414 n.2, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(letter by defendant stating that plaintiff had directed harsh anti-Semitic remarks at
defendant).
88. See Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861-62 (N.D. Tex.
1998).
89. See Knudsen v. Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 807 P.2d 71, 78-79 (Kan. 1991).
90. See George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness of Cal., 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 473, 501,509-10 (Ct. App. 1992), reh 'gdenied and opinion modified (Mar. 2,
1992), review denied and orderednot to be officiallypublished (Apr. 29, 1992).

91. See Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 965 P.2d 696, 699, 708 (Cal. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S.Ct. 1760 (1999).
92. The Michigan Supreme Court conceded in one case what appears to be the tacit
position of most courts: .'[P]ublic interest' is an elusive term, and ... we do not

undertake here to establish the parameters of [the] term." Rouch v. Enquirer & News of
Battle Creek, 398 N.W.2d 245, 266 (Mich. 1986), vacated, 487 N.W.2d 205 (Mich.
1992), andcert. denied, 507 U.S. 967 (1993).
93. Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1065 (D.C. 1996).
94. In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642, 647 (8th
Cir.), reh'gdenied, 800 F.2d 787 (1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987).
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subject of public debate and a part of the nation's free exchange of ideas,"95 or
that "present[s] an issue about which the public had a legitimate need for
information."' While these approaches obviously overlap in significant ways,
their similarity is at a level of abstraction that almost drains them of coherent
meaning. The fuzzy and mysterious line between public and private concerns
thus "appears to encourage ad hoc resolutions of the issue."'9
B. The ProteanProfiles ofPublic and PrivateConcerns
It is possible, of course, for a doctrine's theoretical deficiencies to be
redeemed by useful practical results. An examination of Dun & Bradstreet's
framework for classifying defamation, however, confirms its inadequacy as a
guide to decisionmaking and restraint on judicial discretion. While it would be
an exaggeration to say that the content-form-context standard invariably supports
equally plausible findings of a public or private concern,:' the standard has been
elastic enough to accommodate contradictory impulses and subjective
predilections. The latitude afforded by this approach can be observed in several
clusters of cases.
1. Medical Misconduct
Criticism of physicians and other professional caregivers-by patients, the
media, and even fellow caregivers-is not uncommon. It is therefore not
surprising on occasion to find these individuals as plaintiffs in defamation

95. Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 137, 140 (D. Me.
1998).
96. Smiley's Too, Inc. v. Denver Post Corp., 935 P.2d 39, 42 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996). The discretion vested in courts by the Dun & Bradstreet standard may be
suggested as well by the broad and various terminologies employed in referring to
matters of public concern: e.g., statements "of public import," McNally v. Yamall, 764
F. Supp. 838, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); matters "of public interest," Pearce v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1504 (D.D.C. 1987); Parker v. Evening Post Publ'g Co.,
452 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172 (1996); matters "of
general interest," Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); expression on "issues... which are ofpublic importance,"
Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1066 n.6 (D.C. 1996); or statements "reasonably
related to matters warranting public exposition," Mott v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 910 F.
Supp. 868, 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), aftd, 112 F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1996).
97. Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation in the Employment DischargeContext: The
EmergingDoctrineof CompelledSelf-Publication,26 DUQ. L. REv. 227, 233 n.27 (1988)

(referring to Dun & Bradstreetstandard for defamation).
98. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decisionand the
Rules or CanonsAbout How StatutesAre To Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-

06 (1950) (enumerating over two-dozen pairs of contradictory canons of statutory
construction).
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actions. Broadly speaking, statements that call a caregiver's competence or
conduct into question might plausibly be regarded as involving a matter of either
public or private concern. From one perspective, a reflection on "the
performance and capability of a doctor providing medical care"99 is necessarily
important to the community and thus of public concern. On the other hand, it
can be argued that these derogatory comments are encompassed by the
traditional rule that a charge of inadequate performance of professional duty
constitutes libel per se'" and hence falls into the private domain. As it turns out,
courts have effectively embraced versions of both of these positions.
Admittedly, no single paradigm can resolve every setting in which this type of
defamation might arise-what the Court calls its content, form, and context.
Even taking these variations into account, however, these differences in
classification seem to hinge more on judicial value judgments than on
predictable adherence to the Dun & Bradstreetformula.
Some contrasting outcomes in this area appear explicable only as either
outright contradictions or products of highly dubious distinctions. For example,
charges of incompetence directed at an Arizona ophthalmologist °' and
dishonesty to a Virgin Islands dentist0 2 were summarily determined to involve
matters of private concern.'0 3 By contrast, statements that cast doubt on a
Pennsylvania chiropractor's "ethical and professional character""' were
designated a matter of public concern." °s Of course, as is generally true,"'6
grounds can be discovered for distinguishing and thus reconciling these
divergent holdings. While the Arizona and Virgin Islands courts declined to
explore public policy, the Pennsylvania court cited the state's comprehensive
regulation of chiropractors as evidence that "the quality of chiropractic services
rendered in this Commonwealth is a matter of public concern."' 7 However,

99. Connolly v. Labowitz, 519 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting but
rejecting defendant's argument for public concern classification); see generally ROY
PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND (1997).
100. See Cantrell v. American Broad. Co., 529 F. Supp. 746,752 (N.D. Ill.
1981);
Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Iowa 1968); K Corp. v. Stewart, 526 N.W.2d
429,431 (Neb. 1995).
101. Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant
allegedly remarking that "I wouldn't send my dog or cat" to plaintiff doctor).
102. Ross v. Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (V.I. 1991) (accusing plaintiff of
stealing patients).
103. Id. at 1043 n.3; Hirsch,737 P.2d at 1095.
104. Dougherty v. Boyertown Times, 547 A.2d 778, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
105. Id.
106. See Felix Cohen, The EthicalBasis ofLegal Criticism,41 YALE L.J. 201,215
(1931).
107. Dougherty,547 A.2d at 784.
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Arizona physicians' and Virgin Islands dentists"° are also subject to regulatory
schemes that might have been invoked to divine legislative creation of a public
concern there as well.
The strongest ground for distinguishing among the above decisions, viz.,
"context," actually illustrates the troubling plasticity of that notion. The doctor
and dentist were maligned in relatively intimate and informal settings by others

in the profession,"' whereas the charges against the chiropractor appeared in a
letter to a newspaper from a former patient."' Arguably, the "form" of the latter
signals a decisive willingness to contribute to public discourse; that
interpretation, however, implies that the other two defendants could have
achieved public concern designation by embodying their remarks in similar
letters. This seems an artificial distinction on which to rest such important
stakes, and would create perverse incentives for broader dissemination of
defamatory comments.
More defensibly, a victim of shoddily administered health care (assuming
the truth of h~r charges) may presumably be seeking to advance the public good
by alerting others to this danger. By contrast, another member of the plaintiff s
field-especially a competitor-might reasonably be suspected of having a
private axe to grind; in this "context," the defendant's disparagement could be
viewed as not implicating a matter of public concern. Indeed, the Dun &
Bradstreetplurality may have opened the door to this type of reasoning by
stressing that Dun & Bradstreet's credit report was in the agency's "individual
interest""' 2 and "solely motivated by the desire for profit."' 13 Unfortunately,
however, this sort of contextualizing provides ample scope for judicial
speculation and manipulation. Here, it might be equally conjectured that an expatient's complaint to a newspaper represents a vindictive response to a
perceived slight or disappointing therapeutic result. Conversely, even casual
criticism by a knowledgeable fellow caregiver might be seen as addressed to a
threat to community health and hence of public importance. Classification as a
public or private concern thus rests on courts' evaluation of events and
personalities.
As in other areas-notably Establishment Clause

108. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1451 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
109. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 418(a)(14) (1995).
110. Another ophthalmologist allegedly commented in a telephone conversation
that'"I wouldn't send my dog or cat to [the plaintiff]." Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092,
1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). A dental assistant for a competitor of the plaintiff in Ross
shouted her accusation in the plaintiff's office "to a very small group of people." Ross
v. Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 n.3 (V.I. 1991).
111. Dougherty v. Boyertown Times, 547 A.2d 778, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
112. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 747, 762
(1985).
113. Id.
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jurisprudence 4-context becomes, in large measure, what judges shape rather
than what they find.
Nor can the comparison just cited be dismissed as an isolated anomaly. For
example, comments calling into question the qualifications of a surgeon to
perform augmentation breast surgery and of a child psychologist to work with

children would appear at first blush to occupy proximate if not identical bands
ofthe spectrum of concerns. Nevertheless, courts invoked Dun & Bradstreet's
approach to discern a public concern in the one case but not the other. The
charges against the psychologist, found to involve a private concern, 15 were
made by a pediatrician in a telephone conversation with school officials; 6 the
alleged deprecation of the surgeon, part of a television program highlighting the
dangers of augmentation surgery, was found to address a public concern."' One
obvious difference between the two cases is the presence of the broadcast
medium. However, while Hepps raised the possibility that media defendants
might be entitled to greater protection, this was treated as an element separate
from the public concern criterion, not as a proxy for it." 8 Moreover, the
reference to the surgeon to illustrate the program's broader theme should not
obscure the fundamental similarity of the defamatory content in these two
instances. Indeed, the contrasting contexts can rationally be viewed as
supporting a stronger case for public concern classification of the comments
about the psychologist. Unlike the station seeking material where it could find
it, the defendant pediatrician presumably sought to advance a specific public
good: protecting vulnerable schoolchildren from an assertedly incompetent
counselor. In any event, the protection afforded criticism should not vary with
judicial perceptions of whether the defendant has surrounded it with appropriate
expressive accouterments.
A final comparison from this subgenre of defamation further suggests the
incongruities fostered by the malleable public concern concept. In the abstract,
criticism of a doctor's research, published in a letter to a medical journal by

114. CompareLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (examining validity
of city-sponsored display of creche "in the context of the Christmas season"), with Lynch,
465 U.S. at 705-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that Court's focus on holiday
"context" ignores city's support for religious symbolism). See Norman Dorsen &
Charles Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An ErrorofJudgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837,
852 (arguing that "[t]o adopt the Court's wide-angle inquiry and include the secular
context of the government religious activity . . . would validate nearly every
governmental religious practice"); see also Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the
Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 479-80 (illustrating how resolution of

Establishment Clause challenges to placement of religious displays on public property
hinges on perspective that court chooses to adopt under "endorsement" test).
115. Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1124 n.2 (Me. 1985).
116. Id. at 1124.
117. Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1515, 1533 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
118. See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
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another doctor, would seem to have a more public reach than insinuating
improper practice by a particular obstetrician. When these issues arose,
however, courts found the opposite.119 Again, both form and context provide
colorable but dubious grounds for distinction. The reference to the obstetrician
appeared in a newspaper article attacking the putatively excessive rate of
Caesarian sections in Louisiana; the court therefore linked the reference to the
"national debate" over alternative means of delivery and, more broadly, public
concern over "the medical treatment of women in this country. 120 While
plausible-and consistent with the approach taken in the breast surgery
case-this reasoning should have been available to the critic of medical research
as well. Criticism of the plaintiff s research on fibromyositis.. can be
comparably tied to the "national debate" over appropriate treatment for
devastating diseases and public concern over the adequacy and damages of
newly developed medications. The embodiment of the criticism in a letter rather
than an article should detract little, if at all, from its public nature (nor did it
when directed at the Pennsylvania chiropractor). If anything, the letters section
of a medical journal is presumably a forum for airing public concerns.
Moreover, as an indication of the breadth of factors that a court may consider as
it chooses, the court here took notice of the state's peer review mechanism for
monitoring physicians; the private functioning of this mechanism was said to
demonstrate that the letter's reflection on the plaintiff's qualification was not a
Louisiana also had a private peer review
matter of public concern."
mechanism,"u in a case where the plaintiffs performance as an obstetrician was
brought more sharply into focus. However, the court there apparently felt that
the statute's existence had no bearing on the classification of the defamatory
passage.
2. Business Misconduct
Like health care providers, business executives and their companies are
often attacked for allegedly failing to observe professional standards. Similarly,
as a general proposition, accusations of unethical behavior and other lapses in
business judgment can reasonably be placed in either a public or private
framework. In one sense, business misconduct on a significant scale is
inherently public because of its impact on the affected community and the
questions it raises about appropriate policy responses. On the other hand, Dun

119. CompareConnolly v. Labowitz, 519 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), with
Romero v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 648 So. 2d 866 (La.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131
(1995).

120. Romero, 648 So. 2d at 870-71.
121. Connolly, 519 A.2d at 141-42.
122. Id. at 141.
123. See LA. REv. STAT. § 37:1270(B)(5) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
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& Bradstreet appeared to reject this brand of logic when it refused to hold
decisive that bankruptcy of a local company is "of potentially great concern to
residents of the community" and that knowledge about the incidence of
bankruptcy would "inform citizen opinions about questions of economic
regulation."'" Again, the latitude permitted by the vague content-form-context
approach has allowed courts to adopt either perspective.
Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of almost unfettered discretion in this
area is divergent classifications in strikingly similar circumstances. For example,
courts have chosen to view alleged malfeasance by bank officials through both
broad and narrow lenses. In Sisler v. Gannett Co., u the plaintiff sued over
allegations that he had obtained an improper loan from the bank of which he was
former president. Casting the pertinent context in sweeping terms-the "public
dangers... inherent in insider-dealing with a bank" and the "public's interest in
the conduct of the banking industry"--the New Jersey Supreme Court
accordingly found a public concern present. 26 In Dunlap v. Wayne,12 by
contrast, the Washington Supreme Court assuined that a savings and loan
manager's alleged "kickback" in the form of securing financing from his real
estate partnership would relate to a private concern. 2
As with earlier comparisons, it is not hard to imagine how each of these
courts could have resolved the public concern issue in the same way as the other.
Certainly, the abuse of the savings and loan managerial position alleged in
Dunlap poses "public dangers" and at least indirectly implicates the "public's
interest in the conduct of the banking industry." Conversely, the Sisler court
could have treated the plaintiffs putative self-dealing as garden-variety
impropriety with no more demonstrable public reverberations-arguably
less-than Greenmoss's bankruptcy would have produced. That the defendant
newspaper chose to make the loans to Sisler the topic of several articles should
not justify the different classifications when the underlying charges are
essentially similar. Indeed, the articles' specific focus on Sisler's alleged
machinations 29 deprives their libel of the broader context found to support a
public concern elsewhere. 3 In the related area of public figure doctrine,' the

124. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 789 (1985)
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
125. 516 A.2d 1083 (N.J. 1986).
126. Id. at 1090.
127. 716 P.2d 842 (Wash. 1986).
128. Id. at 846.
129. See Sisler, 516 A.2d at 1085.
130. See Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Okla. 1992); supra
text accompanying note 117; see also Romero v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 648 So. 2d
866 (La. 1995); supratext accompanying notes 119-20.
131. For a discussion of the relationship between the "public controversy"
requirement for limited public figures and the public concern criterion under Dun &
Bradstreet,see infra Part m1(B)(2).
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Supreme Court has forbidden defendants from "creat[ing] their own defense" by
bringing formerly obscure plaintiffs into public consciousness;' 32 analogous
reasoning could bar comparable bootstrapping here. Moreover, this explanation
of Sisler,tenuous to begin with, does not account for the designation of a public
concern where suggestions of impropriety by a bank vice-president were
allegedly made by bank employees. 33
Even if one somehow discounts the contrasting classifications in the banker
suits, it is still hard to rationalize different characterizations of defamatory
attacks on the practices of automobile dealers. In Parkerv. Evening Post
Publishing Co., 34 the challenged article examined a suit against the plaintiff's
dealership for various infractions, in particular discussing an asserted "'straw
purchase' to the customer bringing the suit. 135 In Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v.
Hagel,136 the defendant was a disgruntled buyer who disseminated a flier
describing the dealership and one of its salespersons as thieves. The Parker
court ruled that the article involved a matter of public concern;' 37 the court in
Vern Sims perceived only a "private business dispute."' 3 8 The gist of the
defendant's expression in each case, however, was the same: that the plaintiff's
dealership had engaged in unscrupulous business practices. While the
newspaper piece in Parkerdoubtless offered the more thoughtful and elegant
critique, distinguishing these cases on this basis entails an evaluation of the
comparative quality of the two expressions-an enterprise of highly questionable
validity.'39 Moreover, given the longstanding significance of leafleting in
American society," newspaper articles cannot be presumed inherently superior
to fliers as vehicles for promoting public causes. Indeed, Hagel's pointed attack
on those responsible for the dealership's alleged transgressions lends color to his
claim that the fliers were designed "to warn people that what happened to him
could happen to them.''. Parker, on the other hand, simply acquired his
dealership after the transactions that gave rise to the lawsuit discussed in the
article and was therefore exposed to potential successor liability. His peripheral
connection to these transactions compelled the court to portray the relevant
public concern in broad strokes to encompass his role: the public's concern with

132. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).

133. See Cunningham v. United Nat'l Bank of Wash., 710 F. Supp. 861, 863
(D.D.C. 1989).
134. 452 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172 (1996).
135. Id. at 645.
136. 713 P.2d 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
137. See Parker,452 S.E.2d at 645.
138. Vern Sims, 713 P.2d at 741.
139. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
140. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1-21 (1967).
141. Vern Sims, 713 P.2d at 741.
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"lawsuits and other items of public record," the "particular importance" of
"allegations of fraud and unfair trade practices," the public's "valid interest" in
learning about "the pitfalls of some consumer credit transactions," and the
public's "legitimate interest" in "being informed of potential methods for
collecting a judgment."'"
The disposition of other suits brought by business plaintiffs appears to be,
if not altogether arbitrary, often reliant on fairly superficial indicia. Most
notable, again, is the apparent equating of media interest with public concern.
Thus, where a meeting with a medical laboratory's owner was secretly taped for
a nationally televised program about faulty pap smear testing, the court
summarily concluded that the pertinent subject matter was "[i]nformation about
a medical issue with potential life and death consequences affecting millions of
women."" Similarly, a network news program's undercover investigation of
a supermarket chain was assumed without elaboration to involve a matter of
"public interest," that is, public concern.'" These rulings, though defensible, are
too facile; other findings of public concern seem even more strained and shaped45
by conscious judicial policy. In DairyStores, Inc. v. Sentinel PublishingCo.,1
the New Jersey Supreme Court deemed a newspaper article questioning the
purity of the plaintiff's drinking water to involve a public concern, because
drinking water is "an essential of human life."' In Smiley's Too, Inc. v. Denver
Post Corp., 47 an article reporting complaints against the plaintiff dry cleaner was
judged to touch on a public concern in that it "presented an issue about which the
public had a legitimate need for information."' While the court's observations
about water and dry cleaning are indisputable, they suggest grounds for
discerning a public concern in the disparagement of virtually any product or
service. Where the criticism is aired by the press, and thus presumably has
"affected many consumers,"' 149 courts may be particularly inclined to frame the
applicable concern in public terms.
The flip side of preferential treatment for media coverage of commercial
plaintiffs, of course, is diminished protection for nonmedia speakers. Among
these defendants, the public/private nomenclature may tempt courts to base
classification on whether the statements at issue nominally relate to
governmental entities. Given the vagueness of the content-form-context
standard, it is understandable that courts groping for an intelligible line might
142. Parker v. Evening Post Publ'g Co., 452 S.E.2d 640, 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
143. Medical Lab. Management Consultants v. American Broad. Co., 30 F. Supp.
2d 1182, 1192 n.ll (D.Ariz. 1998).
144. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 932 (M.D.N.C.
1997), aff'd in partand rev'd in parton other grounds, 194 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 1999).

145. 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986).
146. Id. at 230.
147. 935 P.2d 39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

148. Id. at 42.
149. Id.
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resort to such a tangible distinction. Placing form ahead of functional impact,
however, risks the kind .of artificiality and distortion for which the Court's
constitutional state action doctrine has long been criticized.15 Thus, when a
sheet metal company was charged with performing slipshod renovation work, 5 '
and civil engineers were accused of conducting defective boundary surveys, 5 '
the presence of a municipal client in each case facilitated the conclusion that the
defamation pertained to a public concern.'53
This link to government aside, comparable charges of malfeasance deemed
of private concern could also lay claim to address "subject[s] about which the
general public would take an interest."'54 For example, while the validity of a
subdivision's boundary lines obviously contained interest to others besides "the
speaker and a specific business,"' 5 so did the issue raised by the defendant in
Story v. Shelter Bay Co."5 6 Story, a resident of a community developed by
Shelter Bay, had accused the company of various misdeeds. That Story's
complaints touched a wider audience was attested by other residents' having
57
joined her suit against the company for specific performance and damages;1
yet, the court summarily relegated Story's communications to the realm of
"private disputes."'58 Similarly, twenty neighborhood residents in Gasden v.
Louis59 co-signed the defendant's letter complaining of various depredations by
the principals of a construction company at a neighborhood site. Despite this
manifestation of widespread community concern, underscored by the letter's
dispatch to the town's trustees and police,"6° the court tersely determined that the
letter was "not about a matter of public concern."' 6

150. See Henry . Friendly, The PublicPrivatePenumbra-FourteenYears Later,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290-91 (1982); Ira Nerka, A New Dealfor the Protectionof
FourteenthAmendment Rights: Challengingthe DoctrinalBasis of the Civil Rights
Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1977); Mark V.
Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories ofEquality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383, 38991(1988).
151. J & J Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Picarazzi, 793 F. Supp. 1104, 1105-07
(N.D.N.Y. 1992).
152. Nizam-Aldine v. Oakland, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 783-86 (Ct. App. 1996).

153. SeeJ&JSheetMetal Works, 793 F. Supp. at 1112-13; Nizam-Aldine, 54 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 789.
154. J &JSheet Metal Works, 793 F. Supp. at 1113.
155. Nizam-Aldine, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.

156. 760 P.2d 368 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
157. Id. at 370.
158. Id. at 375.
159. 687 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996), appealnot allowed, 677 N.E.2d 816
(Ohio 1997).

160. Id. at 487.
161. Id. at 490.
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One final species of defamation, attacks on competitors, highlights the
inherent subjectivity of the public concern determination in the business setting.
Criticism of commercial rivals would seem to lend itself particularly well to a
consistent philosophy. Absent a compelling claim on public attention, such
criticism might be seen as part of everyday disputes of the business world, and
hence presumptively of private concern. The latitude for characterizing both
content and context, however, enables courts to divine a public concern where
equitable considerations suggest the desirability of greater protection. As usual,
the pursuit of both these approaches discourages belief in a principled constraint
on judicial discretion.
Some courts have hewed to the assumption that jabs at a competitor amount
to private mudslinging notwithstanding indicia of wider public ramifications. In
Snead v. RedlandAggregates Ltd.,'62 the head of an American railroad company
sued two British corporations for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach
of confidential relationship over the corporations' development of a new type of
train car pioneered by Snead's company. A press release explaining the suit,
which accused the corporations of "international theft," "industrial espionage,"
and "international piracy,"'" provoked a counterclaim for libel. In holding these
epithets to implicate only private concerns, the Fifth Circuit declined to couch
the charges in terms of "international competition and industrial espionage."''
Nor did the interest generated within the railroad and construction industries,
reflected by coverage of Snead's press release in industry publications,'65
persuade the court to depart from its premise that "ordinarily [intellectual
property] disputes between two parties will be matters of private concern."' 66 In
Ramirez v. Rogers,67 the Maine Supreme Court refused to even ponder the
possibility that the defendant's statements related to a public concern. There, the
owner of a gymnastic school had alleged that the owner of a competing school
was under investigation by the Attorney General in connection with children at
her school and that the Department of Human Services had received complaints
about her." The obvious implication-of official suspicion of mistreatment of
children at the plaintiff's school-could easily be viewed as a matter of public
concern. After settling the plaintiff's status as a private figure, however, the
court abruptly ruled that no public concern was involved.'69
At the same time, courts have extracted a public concern from disputes that
could readily have borne the opposite designation. Levinsky's Inc. v. Wal-Mart

162. 998 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed,511 U.S. 1050 (1994).
163. Id. at 1328.
164. Id. at 1330.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 540 A.2d 475 (Me. 1988).
168. Id. at 477.
169. Id.
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Stores, Inc.' vividly demonstrates the leeway available to courts to weigh
content, form, and context according to their chosen scale. Levinsky's sued over
the reported comment of a Wal-Mart Store manager that calls to a certain
Levinsky's store were sometimes put on hold for twenty minutes or not
answered at all. 7 In deciding the comment's classification, the court issued
several concessions indicating the presence of a private concern: that the
manager's comment did not implicate the national debate on the worth of WalMart in the marketplace, 7 2 that instead the relevant context for assessing the
comment was the competition between the two retailers,'73 and that the speech
could reasonably be perceived as "a private attack by one individual on
another."' 74 Nonetheless, the court concluded in a foggy deus ex machinathat
the statement raised a matter of public concern when "properly understood in a
broader competition/customer service context."'75 This judgment rested on a
jumble of considerations simply listed at the end of the court's analysis: a
Levinsky's radio advertisement trumpeting the superiority of its clothing
selection to Wal-Mart's, a reporter's interview that elicited the offending
comment, the subsequent newspaper article on Levinsky's containing the
comment, and "the content of the statement itself."' 76 The reference to the
Levinsky's ad, which took several jibes at gaps in Wal-Mart's selection,'77
suggests that Levinsky's to some extent provoked retaliatory remarks by
Wal-Mart. Thus, the court's sense of rough justice may have influenced its
choice of classification as a means of raising the barrier to recovery for an attack
that Levinsky's brought on itself. If so, this attitude injects an indetenninate
equitable element into an already unpredictable doctrine.
A decision by the Eleventh Circuit, Straw v. Chase Revel Inc.,78 invites

similar speculation. Both Straw and Revel published magazines designed to
bring together people interested in potential investment opportunities. In an
editorial, Revel disparaged Straw's publication as "offer[ing] the least of any
publication" in this field and advised potential readers that they would do better
reviewing their newspaper's classified business opportunities themselves. 79 On
its face, this slap at a competing journal appears to involve a private business
squabble as much as the dispute over train car design in Snead. Like Levinsky's

170. 999 F. Supp. 137 (D. Me. 1998).
171. Id. at 139. A second claim for defamation had been dismissed by the First
Circuit as a nonactionable statement of opinion. See Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1997).
172. See Levinsky's, 999 F. Supp. at 140 n.4, 143.
173. See id. at 141.
174. Id. at 142.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 143.

177. Id. at 139 n.1.
178. 813 F.2d 356 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S. 856 (1987).
179. Id. at 358.
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however, Straw had fired the first shot at his rival: he had earlier reported
(truthfully) in his magazine that the American Entrepreneur Association,
founded by Revel, had filed for bankruptcy.' Perhaps this was why the court
chose to view Revel's defamation in the context of an "article... purport[ing]
to give investment advice to its readership"; such advice, the court noted without
elaboration, is a matter of public concern.' Again, though, speakers cannot
forecast with confidence when courts will take this kind of factor into account
to equitably adjust the flexible scope of public concerns.
3. Employee Misconduct
Another recurring scenario that displays the wavering line between public
and private concerns is defamation arising out of the plaintiff's status as
employee. Of course, variation in individual circumstances precludes a per se
rule governing all accusations of employee misconduct. Still, if the
public/private concern distinction had meaningful content, one might expect at
least an inchoate framework for reviewing such charges to have evolved: e.g.,
a presumption that the charge represents a private matter, barring a conspicuous
link to public debate. However, not only has a coherent framework failed to
develop, but the divergent results in these types of cases suggest classification
techniques that are highly subjective if not random.
Where employees have been dismissed because of alleged wrongdoing,
some courts have regarded the subsequent defamation suits as involving a matter
of private concern. However, this classification has tended to be the product of
barely examined assumptions rather than considered analysis." 2 Thus, it is
difficult if not impossible to discern a thread that distinguishes these cases from
others in which defamatory comments about a terminated employee were held
to relate to public concerns. For example, it is understandable that insinuations
of an employee's participation in unauthorized bond trading and financing for
an insurance brokerage and consulting company, incurring losses of large
magnitude, could be viewed as touching a matter of public concern.8 3 Less
apparent, though, is why a company's accusation of an employee's involvement
in a scheme to systematically steal grain should necessarily be viewed in a
different light.' Whatever the disparity in the monetary consequences in the

180. Id. at 358, 361 n.4.

181. Id. at 362.
182. See, e.g., Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Nelson v.
Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1091 n.3 (Ala. 1988); Crump v. P & C Food
Markets, Inc., 576 A.2d 441,446 (Vt. 1990).
183. SeePostv. Regan, 677 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 854 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir.
1988), and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
184. See Nelson, 534 So. 2d at 1088, 1091 n.3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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two cases, a stable and predictable constitutional standard can hardly rest on
such quantitative distinctions."s
Some cases suggest that the form of an employer's accusation can
arbitrarily influence a court's choice of classification. Pearcev. E.F.Hutton
Group, Inc."8 6 arose from a report commissioned by Hutton to investigate a
scandal in which the firm ultimately pled guilty to extensive mail and wire fraud.

Pearce brought suit over the report's reference to his role in the fraudulent

practices. In finding the asserted defamation to involve a matter of public
concern, the court pointed out that the report "was not simply made available to
a narrowly defined group but was made widely available through public
distribution."'" 7 In Mott v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,' an internal investigation
resulted in dismissal of three employees for filing false reports on the effluent
emitted by a wastewater treatment plant. As in Pearce,the plaintiff sued over
the company's public announcement of his alleged participation in the illegal
conduct; here, too, the court determined that the statements fell "within the
sphere of legitimate public concern.""8 9 While assigning weight to the breadth
of dissemination draws some support from Dun & Bradstreet,9 and Pearce's
andMott'sfinding of a public concern also rested on other considerations,' it
is still troubling that a company's decision to publicize its employees' alleged
misdeeds may help it to gain additional constitutional protection. Conversely
(and ironically), statements "made privately in the employment context about an
employee" tilt toward classification as a private concern and hence greater
exposure to liability. 9 2 By airing a charge more widely and inflating its
significance, employers may persuade courts to view the9 4relevant matter in the
93
kind of expansive terms adopted in Pearce andMott1

185. See Post, 677 F. Supp. at 208 (asserting that the "size of the loss" made the
events at defendant company relating to defamatory comments of public concern).
186. 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987).
187. Id. at 1504.
188. 910 F. Supp. 868 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), aft'd, 112 F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1996).
189. Id. at 874.
190. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985) (noting that defamatory credit report was made available to only five subscribers
under confidentiality agreement).
191. For example, the court in each case appeared to be influenced by the high
visibility of the defendant company and its activities. See Mott, 910 F. Supp. at 874
(noting that statements at issue "related to illegal activities by a nationally recognized
corporation"); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1504 (D.D.C. 1987)
(noting that scandal over fraud at E.F. Hutton "received enormous publicity"). This
factor, though, still raises the question of an unpredictable sliding scale. See supra notes
183-85 and accompanying text.
192. Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 576 A.2d 441,446 (Vt. 1990).
193. See Pearce, 664 F. Supp. at 1504 (emphasizing the "central role in the
American economy" of banking and securities industries).
194. See Mott v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 868, 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1995),
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A specific comparison further illumines the inordinate role that the public
spotlight may play in classifying allegations of employee misconduct. In two
cases where the plaintiff was named as a truck driver who had engaged in illegal
activity, courts found a public concern present. Ryan v. Herald Ass'n,19'
stemmed from a newspaper story about illegal dumping which reported that
Ryan had hauled hazardous waste; the court held that the relevant matter of the
defamation was "illegal dumping of hazardous waste."'196 In Veilleux v. National
BroadcastingCo., 97 a television news magazine program about long-distance
trucking alleged that the plaintiff truckers had committed various violations of
federal regulations. Here, the court determined that the defamatory statements
implicated "the issue of long-distance trucking and highway safety."' 198
While it is hard to quibble with these characterizations and their assignment
to the category of public concern, it is also difficult to distinguish these"
cases-except superficially-from the defamation claimed in Great Coastal
Express,Inc. v. Ellington.' Ellington was also a truck driver; he was dismissed
for seeking to tamper with the device that limited the speed at which his truck
could travel. This accusation, which was relayed to Ellington by the company's
general manager, was held to involve "no matter of public concern."2 ' Yet, the
problem of excessive speed by truckers is of public concern in much the same
way as was illegal dumping in Ryan, and indeed relates precisely to the "issue
of long-distance trucking and highway safety" identified in Veilleux. The
obvious difference, once again,2' is that the charge against Ellington was not
included in a media news story. However, this circumstance does not diminish
the degree of public concern for the matter involved. It does, though, give
employers an incentive to contrive ways to charge employees with misconduct
in a form that casts employers as commentators on wider societal problems. 02

aff'd, 112 F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that Anheuser-Busch's environmental
violations "implicate issues of environmental safety and public health").
195. 566 A.2d 1316 (Vt. 1989).
196. Id. at 1319 n.2; see also Machleder v. Diaz, 618 F. Supp. 1367, 1371-73
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in parton other grounds, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987) (television broadcast allegedly suggesting
that plaintiff's company was responsible for dumping chemical wastes on adjacent lot
treated as matter of public concern).
197. 8 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.Me. 1998).
198. Id. at 34.
199. 334 S.E.2d 846 (Va. 1985).
200. Id. at 852.
201. See supranotes 62, 118, 143-49 and accompanying text.
202. The Supreme Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), to extend substantial

First Amendment protection to advertising of prescription drug prices and other
commercial speech provides an instructive analogy. The Court noted that a pharmacist
"could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities in drug prices, giving
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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4. Threats to Public Safety
Charges of unfitness for sensitive positions highlight the barely restrained
discretion available to courts under the public concern criterion. From one
perspective, an allegation that an individual poses a danger to public safety
inherently involves a matter of public concern. 3 In some settings, though,
courts may elect to focus more narrowly on the private relationship between the
individual and her accuser. The disposition in three cases illustrates courts'
freedom to pursue either approach.
Rabren v. Straigis 4 illustrates the ease with which a personal attack can be
translated as a contribution to public discourse. The defendant, who had formed
an association of area harbor pilots, purportedly accused members of a
competing pilots association of incompetence, drunkenness, and involvement in
waterfront corruption and racketeering.0 5 In ruling the statements to involve a
matter of public concern, the court declared that "in this part of the country"
harbor pilots' performance in guiding seagoing vessels was a matter of concern
"not only for the safety of the vessels but for the public in general." 2' While this
comment is unexceptionable, similar observations could be made about the
statements judged to be of private concern in Cooper v. Portland General
Election Corp.2 °7 Cooper, an employee of a company providing maintenance
services at a nuclear power plant, had his security clearance suspended based on
a letter by the plant's security chief. The letter referred to information received
by the plant's operator "indicat[ing] that [Cooper's] presence . . . would
constitute a security threat to the plant."2 8" In terms reminiscent of the Rabren
opinion, the court acknowledged that security at the facility "is certainly a matter
that concerns the public welfare and safety."2' 9 Here, though, the court
characterized the defendant's statements as pertaining to "personal management"
and accordingly held them to involve "a purely private matter between private
parties. 210
The contrasting labels applied to the statements in these two cases can be
explained, but only tenuously defended, by the different forms in which they
were issued. Rabren's remarks were volunteered to a newspaper reporter for
his own and those of a competitor as proof. We see little point in requiring him to do so,
and little difference if he does not." Id. at 764-65.
203. See Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1067 (1989) (indicating that report of identification of plaintiff as North Korean
agent "concerned a public issue").
204. 498 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
205. Id. at 1363.
206. Id.
207. 824 P.2d 1152 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
208. Id. at 1154.
209. Id. at 1155.
210. Id.
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publication,2"1' whereas the statements in Cooper "were not published in a way
that made them available to the general public.""2 2 This distinction again
elevates cosmetic differences over substantive proportionality in the public
concern analysis. Ifthe criticism of the plaintiff harbor pilots had been delivered
by private reprimand, it would have involved no less concern for "the safety of
the vessels" and "the public in general." Conversely, Cooper's reliability at the
power plant affected the public safety to the same degree regardless of the
amount of publicity it received. Indeed, it may reasonably be speculated that
even a single suspect individual's presence at a nuclear facility looms more
frightening in the public mind than an entire coterie of rogue harbor pilots.
Whatever the comparison, it was surely true in both cases, not just Rabren, that
the statements at issue were not "'solely in the individual interest of the speaker
and... [his] ...specific.., audience.""'2 3
The calibration of protection in the area of public safety according to the
defamatory expression's packaging is underscored by the fine distinctions made
inAyala v. Washington.1 4 Ayala, an airline pilot, sued Washington, his former
lover, for accusing him of having used marijuana while off duty. The allegation

appeared in a series of letters over the span of a few months: two addressed to
Ayala's employer and one sent to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").
One of Washington's letters to the airline spelled out the obvious import of her
charge: "'I plead and pray that you will take the necessary action to save the
lives of unsuspecting passengers that board[] the [aircraft] that [Ayala] is in
charge of."' 2 5 Nevertheless, the court found both letters to the airlines to be of
private concern because they "merely communicated information regarding the
alleged misconduct of a single private individual," even though the misconduct
admittedly "could have a significant effect on public safety."2 6 Washington's
letter to the FAA, on the other hand, had also criticized the agency's apparent
discount of accusations that she had earlier lodged against Ayala: "'I forgot he's
an airline pilot and a man. I'm just a nonessential woman and lowly
governmental employee. So [Ayala] ...probably is being helped to cover up
his violations, and I'm condem[n]ed and called crazy."' 217 Because Washington
had asserted that "the agency's failure to give credence to her charges is the
result of discrimination against her as a woman and as a non-elite," her speech
in this instance lay "at the very core of the First Amendment" and thus was on
a matter of public concern.218
211. Rabren v. Straigis, 498 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
212. Cooper, 824 P.2d at 1155.
213. Rabren, 498 So. 2d at 1363 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)).
214. 679 A.2d 1057 (D.C. 1996).
215. Id. at 1060.
216. Id. at 1068.
217. Id. at 1069.
218. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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While allegations that government decisionmaking has been tainted by
discrimination are certainly of public concern, distinguishing the Ayala letters
on this basis demonstrates the distorting effects of contextualization. If an airline
pilot's alleged use of marijuana is not of public concern (a proposition seemingly
at odds with Rabren'sperception of harbor pilots), an accusation of such conduct
should not be transformed by mention in a complaint about agency process that
transcends the topic of flight safety. By the Ayala court's logic, even a simple
claim that Ayala had fathered an illegitimate child might be treated as a matter
of public concern if directed to a government entity and hitched to a charge that
the entity's unresponsiveness is due to violation of an unrelated constitutional
norm.219 Even if this sort of distinction can be supported by reference to abstract
principles, it supplies muddled guidance to speakers subject to this regime and
none at all to those in jurisdictions where a different view could prevail. The
availability of alternative perspectives on this question, and the multiplicity of
possible approaches to the single problem of public safety suggested by just
three cases, reinforce the discouraging prospects for consistent application of the

public concern criterion.

219. The manner in which a public framework can be superimposed on an
otherwise ostensibly private matter is illustrated by a comparison of Staheli v. Smith, 548
So. 2d 1299 (Miss. 1989), and Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
Staheli was a college professor who brought a defamation action against his dean, who
had criticized Staheli's performance when opposing his unsuccessful bid for tenure.
Noting, inter alia,that the "context" of the debate over Staheli's merit was "essentially
an employment dispute," the court found no public concern present. Staheli, 548 So. 2d
at 1305. Grossman raised the question of an assistant professor's fitness in a different
context. In a widely circulated letter, defendant Smart accused a university of racially
preferential employment practices. Pumell, one of the plaintiffs, was a law school
professor at the university. Smart allegedly included as an attachment to his letter a copy
of Pumell's law school transcript indicating that Pumell had failed two courses. Because
the transcript was circulated in "the context of University's hiring procedures," the court
found that it involved a matter of public concern. Grossman, 807 F. Supp. at 1411.
While each of these determinations is defensible-as classifications generally are under
the vague public concern standard-they also suggest incentive for the manipulating
defamatory criticism to avoid private concern designation. Even if Smart had actually
borne a personal grudge against Pumell and simply sought to embarrass him, Smart could
have achieved enhanced constitutional protection by disseminating Purnell's transcript
in the manner that he did. Conversely, while university rules may restrict the form of a
dean's evaluation of a tenure candidate to a "confidential setting," Staheli, 548 So. 2d at
1305; it probably would not strain the academic imagination to devise broader terms in
which to couch a decanal critique: e.g., academic excellence, public funding, or free
speech itself.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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5. Sexual Aggression
The scope and gravity of sexual predation, whether through assault or
harassment, have risen dramatically in the public consciousness in recent
times;" this problem must certainly be considered a matter of public concern.
The question of whether a particular individual has committed such an offense,
however, would seem presumptively to occupy a different status. Nevertheless,
the vague contour of the content-form-context approach tests the ability to
distinguish between simple accusations and those that are an integral part of
speech on a matter of public concern.
Two cases suggest the difficulty of drawing such a line in a principled
fashion. In Shaariv. HarvardStudent Agencies, Inc.,2' the plaintiff managed
a youth hostel. A travel guide published by the defendant stated that '[w]omen
should not stay here, nor should men who don't want to encourage
harassment'; ' the advice was based on suits for sexual harassment brought by

three different women against the plaintiff the previous year.m Assessing the
plaintiff's defamation claim, the court ruled the speech at issue to address a
matter of public concern: viz., "the existence of multiple sexual harassment
claims against the proprietor of a youth hostel open to the general population."'
In Carney v. Santa Cruz Women AgainstRape, the plaintiff's name appeared
on a list of sexual assailants in a newsletter published by the defendant
("SCWAR"), a women's antirape group. The court held that the accusation
involved a matter of public concern because "[t]he content, form and context of
the newsletter portray a publication dedicated to addressing the general topic of
sexual assault and harassment." 6
These decisions do not rest on the rationale that an individual's sexual
aggression amounts to a matter of public concern per se; they do, however
suggest ready means by which a speaker can enshroud an accusation in a
protective context. Both the "consumer guide['s]"' 7 counsel to avoid Shaari's
hostel and the SCWAR newsletter's identification of men who reportedly had
been "'hassling/assaulting/raping' women were designed to alert potential
victims of the alleged offender. In that sense, neither was "solely in the
220. See JOSEPHINEDONAVAN, FEMINISTTHEORY 195 (1992); MONAHARRINGTON,
WOMEN LAWYERS 105-21 (1994); Nan Stein, No LaughingMatter: Sexual Harassment
in K-12 Schools, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 311-28 (Emilie Buchwald et al.
eds., 1993).
221. 691 N.E.2d 925 (Mass. 1998).
222. Id. at 926.
223. Id.

224. Id. at 928.
225. 271 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1990).
226. Id. at 37.
227. Shaari v. Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Mass. 1998).
228. Carney, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience" or
"motivated solely by the desire for profit."' 9 While doubtless true, these
observations might reasonably be made about most publicly aired charges of
sexual violence or harassment; or at least a litigation-conscious accuser might
readily craft a format that incorporates these indicia of public concern. While
a court could theoretically peer behind the facade of an ostensible public service
announcement, expression that otherwise meets judicial criteria for matters of
public concern should not be discredited by the speaker's subjective aim.'o
Moreover, this is an especially sensitive area for judicial investigation of
suspected motives. Permitting inquiry into the "real" purpose of an accusation
might, for example, have allowed Carney to explore whether the newsletter's
reference to him had resulted from a personal grudge against him by a member
of SCWAR. Evaluating charges of sexual assault or harassment at face value,
then, courts might find themselves distinguishing not so much between matters
of public and private concern, as between speakers of greater and lesser
sophistication.
Nor can the implications of this inclusive approach be limited to allegations
of sexual aggression. The Carney court's choice to "focus[] on the broad topic
of the newsletter in general, dealing with matters of sexual harassment and
assault, rather than the specific accusation that a private individual committed a
specific crime,"" 1 could be exercised in other areas of public concern as well.
For instance, murder, arson, and child abuse are also topics of "pressing public

229. Id. (distinguishing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985)).
230. Consideration of possible personal motives might well have changed the
results in cases like Ayala, see supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text, and Rabren,
see supranotes 204-06 and accompanying text. Washington's charge of marijuana use

by Ayala might have been dismissed as a former lover's vindictive flaying, while the
Rabren court could have taken into account the defendant's economic motive for casting
doubt on the competence of members of a rival union. Also, both Carney and Shaari

involve collective enterprises, where determining motive encounters additional practical
difficulties. In part because of such obstacles, the Supreme Court in weighing
constitutionality has largely foreswom searching for illegitimate legislative motives. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S.
27, 56 (1904); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-23 (1970). Even in the few areas like
equal protection where illicit motive may constitute grounds for invalidation, the Court
has erected formidable evidentiary barriers. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
272 (1979). See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW 1509 (2d ed.
1988); Robert G. Schwemn, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond:
DiscriminatoryPurpose in EqualProtectionLitigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 102334.

231. Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape, 271 Cal. Rptr. 30, 37 (Ct. App.
1990).
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concem." 2 It is one thing when a serious offense is attributed to someone in the
setting of a prosecution or other state process; the link to the public sphere
provides a tangible basis for finding a public concern. 3 Hepps itself involved
allegations that the plaintiffs had ties to organized crime which they used to
influence the state's governmental processes; this was thus speech that "concerns
the legitimacy of the political process, and therefore 'matters."' In the absence
of such a link, courts are left to their own subjective devices in determining
whether the wrongdoing at issue "matters." ' 5 While this arrangement is more
speech-protective than the practice of confining public concern classification to
expression overtly tied to governmental activity, it still exposes defendants to the
vagaries of judicial value judgments.
6. Other Examples
The areas discussed thus far do not, of course, exhaust the instances in
which a court's view of the public or private nature of defamatory speech could
reasonably be viewed in a different light. Characterization of the matter
involved and its relevant context can be stretched or contracted to accommodate
a court's sense of the appropriate level of protection in a variety of settings. A
few additional examples suggest the reach of this phenomenon.
A court's power to indulge its predilections in deciding whether a matter of
public concern is involved is suggested by McNally v. Yarnell. 6 The defendant

232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Wiemer v. Rankin, 790 P.2d 347, 352 (Idaho 1990) (finding public
concern where alleged insinuation that plaintiff murdered his wife appeared in article

criticizing prosecutor's investigation of wife's death); Rouch v. Enquirer & News of
Battle Creek, 398 N.W.2d 245, 267 (Mich. 1986), vacated,487 N.W.2d 205 (Mich.
1992), andcert. denied, 507 U.S. 967 (1993) (holding that "a report of an arrest and the
facts used to establish the probable cause for the arrest amount to speech of public
concern" where newspaper article named plaintiff as arrested suspect in rape
investigation and reported details of rape); Jacobson v. Rochester Communications
Corp., 410 N.W.2d 830, 836 n.7 (Minn. 1987) (finding, in case where broadcast story
falsely stated that plaintiff was in prison because of failure to note reversal of plaintiff's
arson conviction, that "the news report describing Jacobson's trial and his activities were
matters of 'undoubted public concern') (quoting Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 756
(Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
234. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
235. Compare,e.g., Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 497,
502 n.7 (S.C. 1998) (accepting stipulation that "matter of public interest [i.e., concern]"
was involved where plaintiff was misquoted as saying that murdered teenager's family
gave her no support to continue her education), and Sartain v. White, 588 So. 2d 204,
213 (Miss. 1991) (finding accusation that defendants were murderers, robbers, and
terrorists not to involve a matter of public concern in the context of"a dispute between
a respectable family as the accused and an accuser with a rather notorious past").
236. 764 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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Yamell was an art historian who commented unfavorably on the authenticity and
value of certain art works by John LaFarge that the plaintiffs were seeking to
sell. While conceding that "the topic of LaFarge may not be of interest to the
population as a whole," the court found Yamell's statements were of public
concern in that they "affect the market for and the tax implications of donating
LaFarge's works among the segment of the population that trades such works as
well as the community of scholars with an interest in LaFarge.",137 However
admirable the court's impulse to shield esthetic criticism, the proposition that
public concern can be adjusted to target an interested "segment of the
population" leaves little restraint on judicial classification of defamatory speech.
Under this approach, a court can choose to recognize or ignore an interested
mini-"public" according to its sympathy for the affected group. Some speech
might thus be relegated to private concern classification because its potential
recipients receive less solicitude than the affluent investors and erudite scholars
in McNally.
A potential for broader discrimination inherent in the public concern
determination may be gleaned from Wilson v. Slatalla."8 The plaintiff there
sued the authors and publisher of a book about a group of computer hackers who
illegally accessed the computer system of major corporations. A named member
of the group, the plaintiff specifically objected to statements concerning "the
ability of the [group's] members to breach the security and threaten the integrity
of large computer systems."" 9 In assessing the nature of the statements, the
court ventured that "the Book contributes to 'robust debate on public issues' and
is not a matter of 'private pique."' '
While gratifyingly protective in this
instance, the court's reasoning raises recurring concerns over the breadth of
context on which courts are free to focus. The danger here is less that a
differently inclined court might have found a private concern by isolating the
allegedly defamatory statements from the larger public discussion of computer
penetrability (although this possibility exists). Rather, it lies in the intimation
that the court's acknowledgment of the statements' public dimension stemmed
from the heft of the book's account. A more narrowly framed accusation
perhaps would have obscured the connection to public debate; an e-mail by
another member of the plaintiff's group, for example, might have been
considered a "private pique."
This type of disparity again underscores the potential incongruities of the
content-form-context formula. The nature of an individual's participation in a
scheme to gain access to corporate computer systems does not depend on the
medium in which it is reported. If private, it does not gain retroactive public
import by inclusion in a book; if public, its significance is not diminished by

237. Id. at 847.
238. 970 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

239. Id. at 413.
240. Id. (citations omitted).
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mention in private correspondence. Alternatively, if Dun & Bradstreet did
indeed contemplate this sort of variability, then the public concern standard is at
best manipulable-offering protection to speakers sufficiently shrewd or welladvised to have attacked their target in a suitable manner. At worst, this
approach is capricious, hinging on the fortuity of the defendant's having chosen
a judicially acceptable vehicle for addressing a public matter.
Another possible danger is the temptation for classification to be colored by
the court's perception of the truth or falsity of the plaintiffs statements.24 In
Forresterv. WVIM TV, Inc.,242 the plaintiff sued a television station in libel for
broadcasting a videotape showing him slapping his six-year-old son at the boy's
youth league baseball game. The scene appeared in a story about adults placing
excessive pressure on children in sports. The court observed that this
theme-whether adults were "emphasizing to five-and-six-year-olds the
importance of winning over the importance of enjoying the game and developing
good sportsmanship"--was obviously a matter of public concern. 3 While
certainly true, it does not necessarily follow that Forrester's behavior toward his
son formed a part of that concern. The incident did take on a public aura by
virtue of the station's decision to feature it in the broadcast story. As many
examples already cited have shown, though, the idea of context is fluid enough
that the court also had discretion to view the disciplinary act as a private matter.
The court emphasized that the video and reporters' accompanying explanations
recounted the episode accurately; the suit in fact was ultimately defeated on this
ground.2 " It is not unfair to speculate that the court may have viewed the matter
in a different light had it believed that the station had falsely portrayed
Forrester's conduct. In that case, the equities would have tilted toward the
plaintiff, and the pertinent context could have been narrowed to enhance the
opportunity for recovery.
In Sartain v. White," s the impact of the defendant's credibility on the
classification of her speech was not merely hypothetical. Sartain had accused
the Whites of terrible deeds, including murder and terrorism. Ordinarily, the
court conceded, it would regard "accusations of this nature" as a matter of public

241. A somewhat analogous problem arises in the jurisprudence of standing. The
Supreme Court has sometimes been accused of confusing proper standing to assert a
constitutional claim with the merits of the claim. See Nancy Levit, The Caseload
Conundrum, ConstitutionalRestraintand the Manipulation ofJurisdiction,64 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 321,342 (1989); Robert A. Sedler, Standing,Justiciability,andAll That:
A BehavioralAnalysis,25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 480-81, 512 (1972); Mark V. Tushnet,
The New Law ofStanding: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 663-64
(1977).
242. 709 So. 2d 23 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
243. Id. at 26.
244. Id.
245. 588 So. 2d 204 (Miss. 1991).
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concern. 2' However, the court minced few words in describing Sartain as
something of a crank and her charges as essentially frivolous. u 7 Accordingly,
the accusations, "in this context and emanating from this source," were denied
public concern classification.
A final illustration of the ambiguous classification of much expression
involves charges of courtroom misconduct. Arguably, any alleged involvement
in the maladministration of justice inherently constitutes a matter of public
concern. In practice, however, courts have refrained from applying this
principle. In one case, an accusation that the plaintiff lawyer was practicing law
(and in particular appearing in court) "drunk" was summarily assumed to address
a matter of private concern.249 In another, a letter asserting, inter alia,that the

plaintiff court reporter had a "'practice of modifying transcripts' was declared

"clearly" to involve a matter not of public concern. The problem, once again,
is not that these determinations are demonstrably flawed; it is that an opposite
ruling in each case would have been reasonable as well. Another court could
have regarded the quality of courtroom practice as a matter of public concern
encompassing the charge at issue, especially where the accuser was a fellow
lawyer and the setting (or "context") was a "crowded courtroom."'" Likewise,
it is not at all "clear" that a court reporter's routine modification of transcripts
lacks substantial public implications.
I. THE AvOIDABILITY OF PUBLIC CONCERN DETERMINATION
As Part II documents, public concern's conceptual indeterminacy opens a
wide realm for subjective judicial discretion. As a result, speakers are
discouraged from criticism on potentially "private" matters, and substantially
similar defamatory expression is subject to disparate protection. Had Dun &
Bradstreet'sframework been compelled by established doctrine, these effects
might be seen as unfortunate but inevitable costs of a clear constitutional
mandate.252 The Dun & Bradstreetplurality, however, was under no such
compulsion; it simply elected to embrace one branch of an ambiguous
jurisprudential ancestry.

246. Id. at 213.
247. See id. (referring to Sartain's "oral tirades within a neighborhood," her "rather
notorious past," and her having "used, misused and played litigation games").
248. Id.
249. Mullen v. Solber, 648 N.E.2d 950,952 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
250. Yesner v. Spinner, 765 F. Supp. 48, 49, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
251. Mullen, 648 N.E.2d at 951.
252. In a sense, the Court has viewed the denial of First Amendment protection to
material found obscene under its imprecise standards in this light. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); id. at 27 n.10 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
476,491-92 (1957)).
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A. The Limited Function of Public Concern in Free Speech Doctrine
Admittedly, the notion that speech on public issues occupies a special
position under the First Amendment has a long jurisprudential pedigree. Thus,
it required no originality for Justice Powell to observe that "[i]t is speech on
"'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection"' and that "'speech on public issues occupies the "'highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values' and is entitled to special protection.2
Nor would it have been difficult for Justice Powell to locate similar sentiments
elsewhere, in both the Court's pronouncements' 5 and scholarly commentary.256

253. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59
(1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978) (citing Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
254. Id. at 759 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citations

omitted)).
255. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984)
(stating that communication regarding matters of public importance "is entitled to the
most exacting degree of First Amendment protection"); Casey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
466 (1980) (describing "[p]ublic issue picketing" as "an exercise of . . . basic
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form" (quoting Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963))); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978) (referring to discussion of governmental affairs as "speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy"); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch.
Dist. 205, Will County, Il., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (identifying the "public interest
in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance" as the "core
value" of Free Speech Clause); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (asserting
that a "major purpose" of First Amendment was "to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs"); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (positing
"maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion" as a "fundamental principle
of our constitutional system"); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1967)
(showing of actual malice required for recovery for invasion of privacy resulting from
publication ofnondefamatory false or misleading report of a "matter of public interest").
Since Dun & Bradstreet,the Court has continued to voice this philosophy. See, e.g.,
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."). For a review of the history of
"[t]he idea that speech on public issues has a special place at the heart of the First
Amendment," see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters ofPublic Concern: The Perils
of an EmergingFirstAmendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 13-20 (1990).

256. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 18-19, 22-27 (1948) (describing positive significance of public issue
speech in context of American democracy and the traditional town meeting); Lillian R.
BeVier, The FirstAmendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1978) (asserting that First
Amendment "in principle" protects only "political speech"); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (asserting that
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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It is also true that the public issue motif had found specific resonance in the
Court's prior opinions on defamation.' New York Times repeatedly exalted free
debate on public issues.Y8 Garrison'sextension of the New York Times actual
malice rule to criminal cases flowed from the premise that "speech concerning
public affairs is... the essence of self-government ' 9 and the goal that "[d]ebate
on public issues" be "uninhibited."26 In barring actions that equate impersonal
attacks on government activity with defamation of particular officials, Rosenblatt
v. Baer26T similarly sought to vindicate the "strong interest in debate on public
26 Sharply
issues.""
distinguishing between actual malice and negligence, St.
Amant v. Thompson263 declared the necessity of shielding some erroneous
expression to "insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public
affairs."122 Greenbelt CooperativePublishingAss'n v. Bresler65 overturned a
libel verdict arising out of accusations at a city council meeting that the
plaintiff's negotiating strategy in attempting to extract concessions from the city
amounted to "blackmail." The Court declared the subject matter of the
newspaper reports of this charge--"public meetings of the citizens of a
community concerned with matters of local governmental interests and
importance"--to be "ofparticular First Amendment concern.",26 And of course

"[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly
political"); Kalven, supranote 16, at 208 (noting the historical importance of free public

speech regarding "the stewardship of public officials"); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255-57 (identifying freedom to
discuss public issues as crucial to the informed judgment that is necessary for voting,
which is the process by which the public governs).
257. For an overview, see Richard Barkley, Note, The Evolution of a Public Issue:
New York Times Through Greenmoss, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 773 (1986).
258. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(expressing "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); id. at 272 ("Whatever is taken
from the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." (citation omitted)) (referring

to reports of officials' conduct); id. at 278 (asserting threat to First Amendment freedoms
where spectre of libel judgments intimidate "those who would give voice to public
criticism"); id. at 279 n.19 (acknowledging that "[e]ven a false statement may be deemed
to make a valuable contribution to public debate") (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 15 (Oxford ed. 1947)); id. at 292 (characterizing good-faith criticism of

government as "the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression").
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74-75 (1964).
Id. at 73. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
383 U.S. 75 (1966).
Id. at 85.
390 U.S. 727 (1968).

264. Id. at 732.
265. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
266. Id. at 11.
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the short-lived regime of Rosenbloom aimed to prevent''26
defamation law from
"stifling public discussion of matters of public concern. 7
Nevertheless, these recurring tributes to speech on public issues did not
chart an inevitable path to the point at which the Court arrived in Dun &
Bradstreet. As noted earlier, the Court itself had recognized in Gertz the
difficulty of ad hoc judicial determination of the public or private character of
expression.26 8 Others have since elaborated on the inherent "lack of any
principled method of determining what kinds of issues ought to be excluded
from the domain of public discourse."269 Thus, a "normative" conception of
public concern undemocratically imposes a judicially selected roster of
appropriate topics, while a "descriptive" conception measured by breadth of
current circulation excludes ostensibly weighty issues that have not yet
registered in the public consciousness.27 As the latter flaw suggests, issues of
public moment are typically rooted in "private" dynamics:
Matters such as abortion, homosexuality, violence in the home, the
'right to die,' AIDS, drug abuse, and surrogate parenthood-among
the most intensely private kinds of concerns one can imagine-are
today at the forefront of public debate and the legislative agenda.
They came to be so only through communications among solitary
individuals struggling with 'personal' concerns.2
Moreover, according inferior protection to one sector of a class of
expression is in tension with the principle of equality in free speech
jurisprudence. The Court has stated that "our cases have never suggested that
expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full First

267. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,47 (1971). See supranotes
22-29 and accompanying text.
268. See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
269. Post, supra note 52, at 673.
270. See Post, supranote 52, at 669-73.
271. Estlund, supranote 255, at 31. For attacks on the public/private distinction
transcending the free speech setting, especially from the perspective of Critical Legal

Scholarship, see Gerald E. Frug, Cities and HomeownersAssociations: A Reply, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1589, 1597 (1982); Peter Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New
Federalism:How the Burger Court'sPoliticalImagery Legitimizes the Privatizationof
Everyday Life, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 263, 264-65 (1984); Karl E.Klare, The Questfor
IndustrialDemocracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectivesfrom LaborLaw
and CivilRightsLaw, 61 OR.L. REV. 157, 162 (1982); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study ofldeology andLegal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1561 n.242
(1983); Christopher Stone, Corporate Vices and CorporateVirtues: Do Public/Private
DistinctionsMatter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441 (1982).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1

42

2000]

Stern: Stern: Private Concerns of Private Plaintiffs:
PRIVATE CONCERNS IN DEFAMATION

'
Amendment protection."272
In an even more sweeping formulation, the Court
declared that "above all else the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."'V3 Elsewhere the Court has asserted that apolitical speech
is not relegated to inferior status under the First Amendment.274
Dun & Bradstreet'ssubordination of speech on "private" matters can be
reconciled with these affirmations of equality, but in a superficial and
unsatisfying way. The Court's endorsements of evenhandedness have typically
been issued in settings where the government has sought to suppress the
expression of opinion.2 5 Defamation actions, on the other hand, seek redress for
the effects of false statements of fact regardless of viewpoint.276 In addition, as
the Dun & Bradstreet plurality noted, the Court "on many occasions has
recognized that certain kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First
Amendment than others." 2 " Like obscenity and fighting words, defamation has
traditionally been included on this list of disfavored categories. 8
Diminished protection for certain defamatory content, however, stretches
' of free speech beyond its modem underpinnings. Even
the "two-level theory"279

272. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
273. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
274. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (stating that "[w]holly
neutral futilities ... come under the protection of free speech" (citation omitted)); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (asserting that guarantees of free speech and press
"are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs"); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (finding it "immaterial whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced... pertain to political, economic, religion, or cultural
matters"); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)
(declaring that "[n]o official ... can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
269 (1941) (rejecting proposition that "the freedom ... guaranteed [in the Constitution]
for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the

ideas seeking expression"). For analysis of the antidiscrimination theme in free speech
doctrine, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equalityas a CentralPrincipleof the FirstAmendment,
43 U. CHn. L. REv. 20,21 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning ofSymbolic Speech
Under the FirstAmendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 38-42 (1973); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 914 (1987).
275. But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (invalidating damages for
nondefamatory false report of plaintiffs' experience as hostages in their home).
276. See TRIBE, supra note 230, at 878 (describing laws confined to compensating
individuals for injury to reputational interests as "ideologically neutral").
277. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5

(1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
278. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that "there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 483 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
279. See TRIBE, supranote 230, at 928-44; see also MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 55-56 (1984); CASS R. SUNSTEiN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrrUTION 233-34
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"lesser" categories of expression are not exempt from the Court's disapproval of
selective restrictions on speech. In R.A. V.v. St. Paul,28 the Court rejected "the
proposition that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to
regulation of particular instances of such proscribable expression." '' To be
permissible, differential treatment of a content-defined subclass must not
undermine core First Amendment values. For example, the discrimination may
be based wholly on "the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable, 2 "2 or on the subclass's association "with particular 'secondary
effects' of the speech."2 3 Neither rationale, however, applies to exposing
defamatory speech on matters of private concern to greater penalties. Unlike a
prohibition on only obscenity whose prurience is most patently offensive-an
illustration given in R.A. V. s - harsher treatment of "private" defamatory speech
does not aim at one portion of an intrinsic element of defamation. Nor does it
seek to curb "secondary effects" peculiar to expression on matters of private
concern. Instead, the Dun & Bradstreetplurality reasoned that the inferior value
of this type of speech entailed a different balance between First Amendment and
reputational interests than that struck in Gertz."5
R.A. V. did allow other bases for selective restriction "so long as the nature
of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that
official suppression of ideas is afoot." Under a regime that singles out speech
judged not to address matters of public concern, however, that possibility exists.
R.A. V itself established that the impermissible suppression may lurk in a
restriction's "practical operatioh." There the Court struck down an ordinance
forbidding display of a symbol that "'one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender.""'28 The ordinance was construed to reach only
fighting words that met this description. In practice, the Court concluded, the
ordinance sought to tilt the debate between advocates of tolerance and their
opponents by limiting the verbal arsenal of the latter; the city had "no such
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules."2 s9

(1993).
280. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
281. Id. at 384.
282. Id. at 388.
283. Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
284. Id. at 388.
285. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-61
(1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
286. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
287. Id. at 391.
288. Id. at 380-81.
289. Id. at 391-92.
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The potential for favoritism from heightened penalties for speech deemed
private is more subtle than in R.A. V, but it is still substantial. While the state
directly enforced the restriction in R.A. V. through the machinery of its criminal
law, the suits permitted by Dun & Bradstreetare initiated by private parties for
damages. As the Court stated in rejecting the plaintiffs' state action argument
in New York Times, however, what matters is "not the form in which state power
has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised."" 0 Moreover, the specter of massive damages may well be more
intimidating to speakers than the possibility of conviction for a misdemeanor. 1
A related but more profound distinction is that unlike the explicitly contentbased restriction in R.A. V, reduced protection for defamation on private subject
matter does not seem to align the state against the proponents of a particular
message. While the distinction has some substance, the surface neutrality of a
rule expediting greater damages for defamation is deceptive. As discussed
earlier, the vague public concern standard invites speakers to embellish
intuitively private expression with the trappings of public discourse.292 As also
suggested, the ability and awareness to fashion these more elevated constructions
are not distributed evenly across all strata of society. The result is not only that
an advantaged speaker can avoid legal consequences visited upon someone
lacking the resources to frame the same accusation as artfully.293 Rather, given
the wavering line between public and private concern, the concerns of the
educated and affluent are more likely to be raised to public stature, while those
more prevalent among the inarticulate and dispossessed remain submerged in the
private sphere. This systematic amplification of one group's voice augments the
already formidable dominance of those at the higher end of the socioeconomic
spectrum in setting the public agenda. In other areas, the Court has taken into
account disparate impact on the poor in striking down ostensibly neutral
restrictions on speech.29
290. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 251,265 (1964).
291. Compare id. at 278 (characterizing Alabama law of civil libel as "a form of
regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that
attend reliance upon the criminal law" (citation omitted)), with ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIs.
CODE § 292.02 (1990) (ordinance establishing misdemeanor violated in R.A. V.).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46; cf.Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
1036, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (objecting to
protection of "cooly crafted libel").
293. A realistic example captures this phenomenon:
[T]he well-heeled newspaper publisher planning an expose of private
corruption may be wisely advised by its counsel to articulate the social and
political implications of its revelations and may thus escape punitive damages
under Dun & Bradstreet. The solitary citizen who pens a letter to the editor
out of exasperation over her personal experience with similar misconduct may
not be so fortunate.
Estlund, supra note 255, at 38-39.

294. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (invalidating
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Finally, even if the considerations just cited do not compel the conclusion
that the Dun & Bradstreetplurality plainly erred, they raise sufficient doubt to
warrant retraction of the public concern criterion for a more fundamental reason.
In requiring the presence of a public concern to qualify for the protection that
Gertz had apparently provided to all speech by private figures, the Dun &
Bradstreet Court turned its back on the historic role of speech on matters of
public concern. As Professor Cynthia Estlund has observed, that speech has
repeatedly served as a "vehicle for expanding the realm of freedom of speech." 5
Thus, speech on public issues has traditionally operated as "a kind of one-way
doctrinal ratchet that was invoked to expand protections without expressly
limiting them." Dun & Bradstreettransformed this function by employing the
public concern concept to shrink the scope of protection. 97 The product-an
amorphous, manipulable standard that deters speech and derives from a
contrived reading of Gertz--did notjustify this reversal.
B. Leaving OtherPublic/PrivateConstructsIntact
A potential objection to the above logic is that it might be thought to
challenge other ways in which the public or private nature of speech fixes the
degree of its protection. In particular, both the free speech rights of public
employees and designation of defamation plaintiffs as public or private figures
rest largely on judicial characterization of the matter involved. The Court's
reluctance to retract Dun & Bradstreet'sparticular public/private distinction may
stem in part from resistance to undermining the legitimacy of this dichotomy in
those other settings. While public-private determinations in these other contexts
are open to criticism, they stand on a more defensible foundation than Dun &
Bradstreet'sdubious formulation.

blanket ban on summoning residents to door for purpose of distributing handbills while

noting that "door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed
causes of little people"); see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)
(striking down "nondiscriminatory" flat license tax on distribution of religious pamphlets
and noting that "[t]his method of disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and
closed out" by burden of cumulative taxes); Estlund, supranote 255, at 38-39.
295. Estlund, supranote 255, at 19.
296. Estlund, supra note 255, at 28.

297. The Dun & Bradstreetplurality's approach was not entirely unprecedented.
The Court in its then recent decision in Connickv. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), had also
employed the idea of distinguishing between matters of public and private concern as a
means of limiting the protection of certain expression. For further discussion of Connick,
see infra Part II(B)(1). Professor Estlund regards the two decisions as similarly
deficient. See Estlund, supra note 255, at 49 (decrying danger that role of public concem
determinations in Dun & Bradstreet and Connick will be extended to other areas).
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1. Dismissal of Public Employees
The public concern test emerged as the touchtone of protection of public
employees' speech in Connick v. Myers,298 where the Court held that the First
Amendment did not encompass workplace expression on matters that fail to
meet this criterion.' Connick narrowed the approach earlier taken in Picketing
v. Board of Education,3 ° which had set forth a more flexible balancing test.
Pickering was a public school teacher fired for writing a letter to the editor of the
local newspaper criticizing the board of education and superintendent of schools
for their handling of past revenue proposals and the level of expenditures on
school athletic programs. In overturning the dismissal, the Court announced its
task as "arriv[ing] at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."3 1" In contrast, Connick set forth a two-step analysis for
determining whether a public employee's speech constitutes proper grounds for
dismissal. 302 As a threshold requirement, the speech must qualify as expression
pertaining to a matter of public concern; if not, the Court's First Amendment
inquiry comes to an end. 3 If the speech can be "fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concem,"3 4 the Court then conducts the
Pickeringbalancing exercise. 0 5
The disposition of the claim in Connick indicated that both phases of the
analysis pose significant hurdles to complaining employees. Myers, an assistant
district attorney, objected to her proposed transfer to a different section of the
criminal court. She prepared and distributed to other assistant district attorneys
a questionnaire soliciting their views on the office transfer policy, office morale,
the level of confidence in supervisors, and other matters. 3' District Attorney

298. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

299. Id. at 147.
300. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

301. Id. at 568.
302. This analysis parallels the process adopted for determining whether a public
employee's dismissal has comported with procedural due process. The Court first
determines whether the employee has a property interest in retaining her position by
virtue of a statutory or comparable entitlement. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 60203 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972). If so, the Court then
assesses the adequacy of the procedures afforded for protecting the employee's interest.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

303.
304.
305.
306.

Connick,461 U.S. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 155-56.
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Connick then fired Myers for her refusal to accept the transfer and her
"insubordination" in circulating the questionnaire. 7
In reviewing Myers's challenge to her discharge, the Court found that the
bulk of the questionnaire could not "be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community."3 8 Instead, the Court
regarded the questions as reflecting Myers's disgruntlement with her transfer and
dissatisfaction with the office status quo.30 9 Where the speech at issue is of a
personal nature, the Court declared its adherence to the proposition that "a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior."'31
The Court did acknowledge one of the questionnaire's inquiries as
pertaining to a matter of public concern: a question asking whether Myers's
fellow assistant district attorneys ever felt pressured to work in political
campaigns.3" Under the Pickeringbalancing test, however, the government's
interest in "the effective fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public"3"' here
outweighed Myers's interest in distributing the questionnaire in the office.3 13
While Connick did not show that the questionnaire had impaired Myers's ability
to perform her responsibilities"' or undermined the operation of the office,.. the
Court believed that an employer need not "allow events to unfold to the extent
that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action."3" 6
Connick's approach has been subjected to considerable criticism on a
number of grounds. Some observers have questioned the basic notion of
gauging the entitlement of employee speech to First Amendment protection
according to whether the speech implicates a matter of public concern. 317 More
commonly, commentators have attacked the particular version of the public
concern test as promulgated and applied in Connick. A number have criticized
what they view as Connick's crabbed conception of matters of public concern,

307. Id. at 141.
308. Id. at 146.
309. Id. at 148.
310. Id. at 147.
311. Id. at 149.
312. Id. at 150.
313. Id. at 151-54.
314. Id. at 151.
315. See id. at 153 (finding support for Connick's "fears that the functioning of his
office was endangered").
316. Id. at 152.
317. See Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom ofSpeech in the Public
Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,25-29, 38-51 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1982

Term-Leading Cases: Rights of Public Employees, 97 HARV. L. REV. 164, 167-70
(1983).
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as demonstrated by the exclusion of Myers's inquiries into the working
1
conditions of the district attorney's office?"
Some have particularly faulted the

degree of deference accorded public employers' apprehension of disruption as

grounds for employee discipline."' Moreover, as in the defamation context,32
Connick's concept of "matters of public concern" has been criticized as too
"
vague a basis for determining employees' rights of expression.32
' Some
observers have pointed to apparent contradictions in lower court approaches to
document
the broad discretion in determining what constitutes a matter of public
3n
concem.
Notwithstanding the force of these criticisms, Connick's framework could
survive the abandonment of the public concern test in defamation. Unlike Dun
& Bradstreet'sholding, which is based on an abstract and questionable judgment
that speech on matters of private'concern is less worthy of protection, Connick's
regime is rooted in practical concerns about the administration of government.
Connick's differential protection of public employees' speech flows from a
legitimate desire to avoid making every criticism of a public official potential
grounds for a constitutional case.3" Without some sort of mechanism for
screening out essentially personal grievances, courts could be faced with a flood
of litigation over employee challenges to dismissals linked to something that
they had said.3" The threat of such litigation could substantially hamper
effective governance. However debatable the level of deference displayed to the
employer's judgment in Connick,32 it is hard to dispute the Court's belief in the
need for significant managerial latitude free of intrusive judicial oversight.326

318. See, e.g., Estlund, supranote 255; Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in
PublicSector Employment: The Deconstitutionalizationofthe PublicSector Workplace,
19 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 597, 648-49 (1986); Massaro, supranote 317, at 37-38.
319. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 317, at 33-37; Jonathan A. Marks, Comment,
Connick v. Myers: Narrowingthe Scope ofProtected Speechfor PublicEmployees, 5
U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 337, 361 (1984); Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of
Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the FirstAmendment in the Administrative State, 106
YALE L.J. 1233, 1240 (1997).
320. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to
Define Speech on Matters ofPublic Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988); Massaro, supra
note 317, at 27-33; Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 547-67; D. Gordon Smith, Comment,
Beyond "PublicConcern ": New Free Speech Standardsfor PublicEmployees, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 249, 258 (1990).
322. See, e.g., Allred, supranote 321, at 50-75; Smith, supranote 321, at 257-62.
323. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
324. See Rosenthal, supranote 54, at 546-47.
325. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (asserting need for "wide degree of deference"

to employer's judgment).
326. See id. at 146. As Justice O'Connor has explained:
[T]he extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of
the government's mission as employer. Government agencies are charged by
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Thus, some means of identifying employee speech eligible for heightened
constitutional protection, though imperfect, seems inevitable. 27
Perhaps the strongest indication of the weight of these considerations is the
extent to which criticism has focused not on Connick's distinction between
speech on matters of public and private concern, but on its application of that
distinction. At the outset of his dissent, Justice Brennan chastised the Court for
refusing to treat Myers's speech about "'the manner in which government is
operated"' as a matter of public concern.328 In addition, he objected to the
Court's weighting the context of employee speech twice: both as a factor in
determining whether it involves a matter of public concern and then in deciding
whether the speech impeded the functioning of the office.3 Finally, Justice
Brennan argued that insofar as Myers's questionnaire concededly addressed at

least one matter of public concern, Connick should not have been able to fire her
without demonstrating that her speech in fact disrupted the office. 330 As
previously noted, most critical commentary has echoed Justice Brennen in
disputing the form of Connick's public concern test rather than the existence of
a public concern criterion.33'
As for difficulties with vagueness, the basic dichotomy between ordinary
employee complaints and broader commentary suggests at least potentially
clearer guidance than the open-ended categories of public and private concern
in defamation. 332 Lower courts have expressed their understanding that the thrust
of Connick's public concern test is its exclusion of "mundane employment
grievances. 333 Moreover, while the distinction between employee speech on

law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those
tasks as efficiently as possible. When someone is paid a salary so that she
will contribute to an agency's effective operation, the government employer
must have some power to restrain her.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
327. Cf Clark A. Remington, Note, A PoliticalSpeech Exception to the Regulation
of Proxy Solicitations, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1468-69 (1986) (asserting need for
distinction, though difficult to make, between proxies advancing political goals and other
proxies in order to effectuate proxy rules).
.328. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966)).
329. Id. at 157-58.
330. Id. at 158.

331. See supranotes 317-18 and accompanying text.
332. Even a thoughtful critic of the use of a public concern test in both Connick
and Dun & Bradstreethas conceded that there is "a commonsense difference between
purely personal gripes and gossip on the one hand, and proposals for political reform on
the other." Estlund, supranote 255, at 4.
333. Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 1992);
see Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that public
concern test is intended to determine whether employee's speech "takes on significance
outside the workplace or whether it deals primarily with an employee's personal
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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matters of public and private concern can be uncertain, some ambiguity in this
area may be inescapable. In this regard, it should be noted that proposed
alternatives to the Connick test are also susceptible to varying interpretations.
For example, one commentator334 has proposed a standard drawn from the fourpart test for "incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms" promulgated

in United States v. O'Brien.335 The last two prongs of the O'Brien test require
that the governmental interest advanced by such a restriction be "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" and that the restriction be "no greater than
essential to the furtherance of that interest."'33 As has been noted elsewhere, this

test is neither precise nor even necessarily speech-protective.337 Other standards,
involving two-step analyses and balancing exercises,338 leave ample room for
divergent applications. Even Pickering's original form of balancing, while
shielding more employee speech than Connick, hardly provides a crystal forecast
of permissible workplace expression.

employment problem"); Southside Pub. Sch. v. Hill, 827 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1987)

(finding expression of public concern where plaintiffs were "not asserting a private
grievance respecting employment or working conditions"); Terrell v. University of Tex.
Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987)
(stating that the test is "whether the speech at issue ... was made primarily in the
plaintiff's role as citizen or primarily in his role as employee"); Berger v. Battaglia, 779
F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (construing Connick
as embodying principle that "allpublic employee speech that by content is within the
general protection of the First Amendment is entitled to at least qualified protection
against public employer chilling action except that which, realistically viewed, is of
purely 'personal concern' to the employee-most typically a private, personnel
grievance"); Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing
between employee speech designed to bring issue of public concern to attention of public
and speech intended "to further some purely private interest"); McKinley v. City of Eloy,
705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (regarding public employees' speech as not of
public concern when "it is clear that such speech deals with individual personnel disputes
and grievances and that the information would be of no relevance to the public's
evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies").
334. See Rosenthal, supranote 54, at 573-82.
335. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
336. Id. at 377.
337. See Nat Stem, In Defense of the ImpreciseDefinition of Commercial Speech,
58 MD. L. REV. 55, 140-42 (1999).

338. One proposal would permit government regulation of employee speech if the
government could regulate the same speech directly through criminal sanctions. If it
could not, step two would ask 'whether any government interests exist that might justify
restriction ofthe speech because the speaker happens to be a public employee." Massaro,
supra note 317, at 67. Another proposed approach would first require proof that the
employee's speech actually caused disruption of government efficiency. Even if such

proof were provided, the state could not discipline the employee if she could
"demonstrate that the speech was more valuable to the public than the disruption it
caused." Smith, supra note 321, at 269.
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Moreover, unlike Dun & Bradstreet,which sharply diminished Gertz's
safeguards, Connick's standard does not necessarily entail substantial curtailment
of employees' free expression. In Rankin v. McPherson,339 decided a few years
after Connick, the Court demonstrated that protection for statements on matters
of public concern extends well beyond the workplace-related examples
mentioned in the Connick opinion." McPherson, a clerical employee in a
constable's office, was fired for a remark that she made to a co-worker after
hearing of the attempted assassination of President Reagan: "[I]f they go after
him again, I hope they get him."34 Indicating its view that McPherson's
342
statement amounted to no more than a commentary on the President's policies,
the Court found that the remark "plainly dealt with a matter of public
concern."'M In balancing McPherson's interest in making her statement against
the state's interest in the efficient functioning of the constable's office, the Court
ruled in favor of McPherson because her remark posed a "minimal" danger to
the office's successful operation. 3" This protective impulse has been emulated
by numerous lower court decisions where employee speech could plausibly be
construed as touching on a matter of public concern.345 These developments do
339. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
340. The Court in Connickindicated that statements would be considered of public
concern if they are "ofpublic import in evaluating the performance" of a public official,
seek to inform the public that the public entity is "not discharging its governmental
responsibilities," or attempt to "bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach
of public trust"by a public official. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
341. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381 (footnote omitted).
342. See id. at 386-87.
343. Id. at 386.
344. Id. at 390-91.
345. See, e.g., Dishnow v. School Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that high school guidance counselor's disclosure of school board's
alleged violations of open-meetings law and writing articles for newspaper on such topics
as the sharing of household tasks by working couples addressed matters of public
concern); Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165, 170 (1st Cir. 1995) (teacher criticizing
her own department and suggesting possible law violations by school engaged in
protected speech); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 396 (8th Cir.
1995), cert.denied, 517 U.S. 1166 (1996) (city engineer's allegation of misuse of public
funds and potential danger to community's citizens because work on dam had not been
done deemed to involve a matter of public concern); Davis v. Ector County, 40 F.3d 777,
782 (5th Cir. 1994) (employee's allegation of public officials' sexual harassment of
public employees considered of public concern even if employee had mixed motives in
making disclosure); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 192-93 (4th Cir. 1994)
(teacher's letters to editor of local newspaper asserting school board's mismanagement
of taxpayers' money addressed matter of public concern); Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317,
1329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993) (comment by employee in district
attorney's office that district attorney in case avoided disclosure of information because
it would be helpful to the defense addressed a matter of "serious" public concern);
Peterson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 915-17 (11th Cir. 1993) (criticism by
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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not prove that Connick's doctrine should be retained in its present form.
However, they do suggest that Connickposes less threat to free expression than
Dun & Bradstreet,and that the shortcomings of a public concern test in the
employment setting can be remedied by refining rather than abolishing
Connick's approach.

2. Identification of Limited Public Figures
The logic of withdrawing Dun & Bradstreet'spublic concern test could be
seen as threatening the integrity of the Court's public figure doctrine. While that
doctrine does not employ a public concern criterion, its reliance on identification
of public controversies makes it vulnerable to similar criticism. The
determination of public or private status, however, has more coherence and
imposes fewer burdens than attempting to classify the content of plaintiff's
speech.
Of the three types of public figures recognized by the Court in Gertz,3. by
far the most frequently recognized is the voluntary limited public figure. 347 To

employee of municipal housing authority of authority's pre-leasing practice and
maintenance problems addressed matters of public concern notwithstanding personal
component of complaint); Powell v. Gallentine, 992 F.2d 1088, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1993)
(professor's allegations of grade fraud addressed matter of public concern); Sheetz v. The
Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202,212 (3d Cir. 1991) (report of domestic violence by offduty police officer recently named "officer of the year" involved matter of public

concern); Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1989), appeal after
remand, 979 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993)

(firefighter's comments to fire and police personnel criticizing manner in which police
and firefighters treated patient in drug-induced, yet conscious, state involved matter of
public concern).
346. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz Court recognized all-purpose public figures,
limited public figures, and involuntary public figures. See id. at 344-45.
347. See Eric M. Jacobs, Comment, Protectingthe FirstAmendment Right to
Petition: Immunity ForDefendants in Defamation Actions Through Application of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,31 AM. U. L. REv. 147, 152 (1981). The Gertz opinion
suggests that general purpose public figures number relatively few. See Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 345. This view has been borne out by subsequent lower court decisions. See Gerald
G. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in ConstitutionalPolicy-Making, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 645, 680-81 (1977) (noting that "[o]nly plaintiffs such as William F. Buckley
and Johnny Carson, both of whom were designated public figures by lower courts, would
seem to meet the Court's standard" (footnotes omitted)); see generally Michael J.
Gunnison, Note, GeneralPublic Figures Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 58 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 355, 370, 379 (1984) (discussing a survey of defamation cases that
revealed few instances in which the federal bench had relied on the general-purpose
public figure theory to justify an application of the New York Times standard). A more

recent search by the Author disclosed a continuing paucity of adjudicated general public
figure cases. As for involuntary public figures, Gertz acknowledged that these would be
"exceedingly rare." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. In fact, later Court decisions and lower court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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attain this stature, plaintiffs must have "thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved." Such persons assume the position of a public figure "for a limited
'
range of issues."349
In Gertz and three subsequent cases, the Court rejected the
defendants' attempt to assign this status to the plaintiffs, either because any
dispute involved did not qualify as an appropriate public controversy, or because
the plaintiffs had not "thrust [themselves] into the vortex"35 of that
35
controversy. '

The public controversy requirement has been faulted as both inconsistent
and vague. Some have contended that it is impossible to reconcile the
requirement with Gertz's criticism of the Rosenbloom plurality for having
'
assigned judges to identify issues of "general or public interest."352
The
imprecision of the term has been seen as a source of manipulation and
confusion.3 53 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,54 for example, a magazine incorrectly

developments suggest the near impossibility of a plaintiff being characterized as an

involuntary public figure. See Nat Stem, UnresolvedAntitheses of the Limited Public

FigureDoctrine,33 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1091-95 (1996).
348. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
349. Id. at 351.
350. Id. at 352.

351. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1979) ("A libel
defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the
demanding burden of New York Times."); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-36
(1979) (stating that the plaintiff had not "thrust himself' into public controversy or
"assumed any role of public prominence"); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,453-55
(1976) (holding that the publicized divorce proceedings of private figures was "not the
sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 352 (1974) (holding that attorney who brought wrongful death action on behalf of
family of boy shot to death by police officer did not inject himself into controversy over
criminal prosecution of officer).
352. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (noting the Court's "doubt [of] the wisdom of
committing this task to the conscience ofjudges"). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 487 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he Court resists this result
by concluding that the subject matter of the alleged defamation was not a 'public
controversy' as that term was used in Gertz"); TRIBE, supra note 230, at 880-81 (noting
that the test for determining ifplaintiffs have voluntarily injected themselves into a public
controversy requires judges "to determine whether a controversy is 'public,' a
determination indistinguishable ... from whether the subject matter is of public or
general concern" (footnote omitted)); Ashdown, supra note 347, at 683-84 (asserting that
the Court's definition of limited public figures "exacerbated the exact problem it
professed to have found in Rosenbloom" by adding the requirement of a public
controversy).
353. See John Hilbert, Comment, A Criticismof the Gertz PublicFigure/Private
FigureTest in the Context ofthe CorporateDefamationPlaintiff,18 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

721, 729-38 (1981) (noting confusion and inconsistency over the meaning of a public
controversy); Note, The EditorialFunctionand the Gertz Public FigureStandard,87
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1
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specified adultery as the grounds on which the scion of a wealthy and wellknown family had been granted a divorce after highly publicized proceedings.355
In the libel suit brought by his wife, the Court refused to consider her a limited
public figure.356 While the divorce may have amounted to a 'cause cdldbre,"'
and thus an object of public interest, it did not in the Court's eyes constitute the
sort of public controversy that Gertz required.3" 7 Firestonehas been sharply
criticized for narrowly characterizing the relevant controversy and eligible
disputes.358 The apparent lack of uniformity among lower court approaches has
further contributed to an impression of a malleable and subjective standard.359
As with Connick's framework, however, these criticisms do not compel
abolition of the Gertz limited public figure standard. Unlike Dun & Bradstreet's
public/private concern dichotomy-which was explained by a strained and even
contradictory reading of Gertz as well as a questionable balancing

YALE L.J. 1723, 1742 (1978) (contending that Gertz failed to adequately define terms
such as "public controversy" and did not provide specific criteria for lower courts to
apply); Eileen Carroll Prager, Note, PublicFigures,PrivateFiguresand PublicInterest,
30 STAN. L. REV. 157, 176-77 (1977) (suggesting that "by varying the perimeters of 'the

controversy' the Court can determine the public or private status of the plaintiff and,
ultimately, the outcome of the case before it"); Todd S. Swatsler, Comment, The
Evolution ofthe Public FigureDoctrinein DefamationActions, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009,

1030-31 (1980) (stating that the public controversy requirement "often does more to blur
than to elucidate the relevant issues").
354. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
355. Id. at 458.
356. Id. at 455.
357. Id. at 354. The Court also found that Mrs. Firestone did not voluntarily seek

the publicity that her legal dispute received because the law compelled her to go to court
to obtain her divorce and that press conferences called by her represented "an attempt to
satisfy inquiring reporters" rather than an effort to shape the outcome of the trial. Id. at
454, 455 n.3.
358. See id. at 487-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that Mrs. Firestone
appeared to satisfy the public figure criteria of Gertz, but that "[t]he Court resists this
result by concluding that the subject matter of the alleged defamation was not a 'public
controversy' as that term was used in Gertz');James P. Naughton, Comment, Gertz and
the Public Figure DoctrineRevisited, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1053, 1071 (1980) (criticizing
Firestoneopinion for having "engaged in ad hoe content analysis"); Note, Divininga
Public Controversyin the ConstitutionalLaw ofDefamation, 69 VA. L. REV. 931, 941
n.56 (1983) (suggesting "reaction to Firestone's divorce" or "domestic conflicts
generally" as alternative characterizations of controversy).
359. See Alexander D. Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation:
Attacking the Bastion ofNew York Times v. Sullivan, 25 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 501, 518-25
(1981) (noting the inconsistency with which courts have applied the Gertz distinction
between public figures and private individuals, leading to "a maze of seemingly
irreconcilable cases"); Note, Divining a Public Controversy, supra note 358, at 931

(asserting that most courts attempting to define public controversy "have sunk into a
morass of ad hoc rulings").
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exercise-Gertz rests on a substantial foundation. Implicit in the original
extension of the actual malice rule for public officials to speech about public
figures3" was the existence of a category of individuals falling outside these two
groups. Moreover, Gertz's principal rationale for distinguishing between public
and private plaintiffs informs the public controversy requirement. By "invit[ing]
attention and comment,, 361 public figures are said to assume the risk of injury
from defamatory falsehoods.3 62 Conversely, private individuals have not
voluntarily exposed themselves to this risk and therefore have "relinquished no
part of [their] interest in the protection of [their] good name."3 63 Private victims
of defamation were therefore viewed by Gertz as "more deserving of
recovery." 3'
It was thus consistent with this overriding "normative
consideration '3 65 to define the predominant group of public figures as those who
had assumed an active role in public controversies.
In practice, the public controversy requirement has not spawned an arbitrary
conception of limited public figures. While courts have not followed a uniform
approach to identifying limited public figures, divergences fall into discernible
patterns. As this Author has argued elsewhere, courts tend to adopt either a
formal model of strict adherence to the discrete elements of the Gertz test or to
a less rigidly compartmentalized equitable model. 36 The persistence of an
equitable impulse suggests the value of revising Gertz's formulation. However,
equitable analysis can be incorporated by modifying rather than abandoning
Gertz's classification scheme.367
The validity of a public controversy criterion can also be accepted without
embracing this theory. Even a thoughtful critic of the public concern test in both
the defamation and public employment settings3 6 considers the public
controversy requirement a potentially constructive analytical tool in limited
public figure determinations. She has proposed substituting an empirical method
of identifying public controversies for the judicial assessment of topical
369 Thus modified, the public controversy
worthiness implicit in Firestone.

360. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). Both Butts and the plaintiff in a companion case, Associated Press v.
Walker, see id.at 130, were found to be public figures. See id. at 154-55. The result in
Butts derived from an unusual and somewhat complicated configuration of opinions. For
a detailed dissection, see Kalven, supranote 19, at 275-78.
361. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
362. See id. (noting the increased risk of voluntary exposure).
363. Id. at 345.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 344.
366. See Stem, supra note 347, at 1043-44 (summarizing this thesis).
367. See Stem, supra note 347, at 1101-02.
368. See generally Estlund, supranote 255.
369. See Estlund, supra note 255, at 51.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/1

56

Stern: Stern: Private Concerns of Private Plaintiffs:
2000]

PRIVATE CONCERNSIN DEFAMATION

requirement can provide a relatively objective means of helping to determine
public figure status.37 °
Finally, one can point to a small but telling indication that the experience
of the Gertz regime has differed from that of Dun & Bradstreet. As early as
1980, a commentator could plausibly assert that the public figure test "has
evolved into a reasonably concrete set of guidelines. 371 A decade-and-a-half

after Dun & Bradstreet,the case law does not support a comparable observation
about the public concern test for defamation, and the prospects seem bleak that
it ever could.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a hypothetical designed to illustrate the
indeterminacy of the concept of "public concern" as a criterion for classifying
defamatory expression. Case law confirms the intuition that derogation of the
doctor in this instance could be rationally viewed as implicating a matter of
either public or private concern. On the one hand, a physician's competence and
integrity presumably matter to the community. More broadly, such a comment
can be linked to the national debate over the quality and cost of health care. On
the other hand, the form and content of the complaint could support a finding
that the defendant was primarily venting an individual grievance. As is so often
the case, neither a determination that the complaint addressed a public concern
nor a ruling that only a private concern was involved could be considered plainly
wrong. Because the standard is so vague and subjective, courts can (and often
do) arrive in good faith at opposite characterizations of essentially similar
expression.
This unsatisfactory scheme might be worth trying to salvage if it had been
compelled by doctrinal necessity and could be substantially improved by further
refinement. Dun & Bradstreet'spublic concern test, however, contradicts the
Court's own prior critique in Gertz of ad hoc judicial assessments of the
importance of speech. Experience has confirmed the inherent futility of attempts
to mold these assessments into a coherent system of principled decisionmaking.
It is not too late for the Court to restore the original understanding of
Gertz's regime. The apparently unqualified application of Gertz's protections
to all "private individuals' 3 2 represented a reasoned exercise in balancing free
speech and reputational concerns. Through carefully calibrated requirements for

370. See Estlund, supra note 255, at 51-52.
371. Naughton, supra note 358, at 1078-81.
372. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
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damages, the Gertz Court sought to steer a middle ground between
Rosenbloom's overinclusive barrier to defamation suits and the draconian rigors
ofthe common law. Dun & Bradstreetimposed a new and inevitably confusing
layer of complexity on this manageable framework. The cost in deterred speech
from the unpredictable public concern test is literally incalculable. Whatever
that cost, however, it outweighs the negligible benefit of an unworkable
standard.
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